US v. Thompson:
Thompson, a citizen of Jamaica, was convicted on drug and gun charges and
sentences to (among other things) a five-year term of supervised release, which
he began serving in June 2010. One special condition of his supervised release
was that he not return to the United States without permission and, if he did
return to the US (for any reason), he was required to report to the nearest
probation officer within 72 hours.
In 2011, Thompson was found in
California and promptly removed back to Jamaica. A petition was filed seeing
the revocation of his supervised release was filed, and a warrant issued, but
Thompson was deported before it was served. In December 2014, six months before
his five-year term of supervised release would end, Thompson returned to the
US. He did not notify a probation officer and was arrested in Florida on drug
charges in June 2017, two years after his supervision was supposed to end. Thompson
argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his term of supervised
release. The district court disagreed, holding that Thompson had been a
fugitive from justice, which tolled his term of supervised release beyond the
originally projected termination date. Thompson was sentenced to 30 months in
prison.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit vacated
Thompson’s revocation, partially. The court rejected Thompson’s argument that
because he didn’t know about the original petition filed in 2011 that he could
not have actively and knowingly avoided adjudication for it. Fugitive tolling
in the supervised release context has nothing to do with whether the supervisee
knows there is a petition pending against him, due to the nature of supervised
release and Congressional desire that defendants serve their entire term. By
failing to report to a probation officer Thompson did not serve his entire
supervised release term and that was “the result of Thompson’s own misconduct,
in the form of knowingly absconding from supervision.” However, the court noted
that it was a more difficult issue to determine precisely when the tolling period
ran and therefore remanded the matter to the district court to “consider other
possible bases for jurisdiction in this case.” In particular, the court held
that once Thompson was in custody in Florida his “fugitive status came to an
end for tolling purposes.”
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