Unless Otherwise Limited, Stipulation Agreed to for Initial Trial Applies to Second Trial

US v. Robertson: Robertson was involved with a string of robberies in eastern Virginia, for which he wound up being charged with numerous counts Hobbs Act robbery (in addition to conspiracy and attempt), using a firearm during a crime of violence, and a single count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Prior to an initial trial on all charges, Robertson agreed to a stipulation with the Government that the robberies “affected commerce.” That trial resulted in a mistrial. After granting Robertson’s motion to sever the felon-in-possession charge from the others, he was convicted at trial for that offense. At the trial on the other charges the district court allowed, over Robertson’s objection, the entry of the stipulation that the robberies affected commerce. Robertson was convicted on all counts.

Robertson raised several issues on appeal, all of which the Fourth Circuit rejected. Of particular interest, he argued that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the entry of the stipulation he agreed to for the first trial, but not the second. Reviewing how other circuits had resolved the issue, the court concluded that if the language of the stipulation itself limits its use beyond the initial trial, then it cannot be used in subsequent trials. However, because the stipulation here did not contain such language, it was not limited to being introduced in the first trial. The court also concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support Robertson’s convictions, that his trial was timely, and that any error regarding jury instructions was invited by Robertson since he agreed to the given instruction.