New Trial Motion Can Be Based Only On District Court’s Disagreement With Jury’s Inferences

US v. Rafiekian: Rafiekian worked with Michael Flynn’s lobbying and consulting group. After a failed coup in Turkey, which Turkey’s leader blamed partly on a dissident cleric who resided in Pennsylvania, Rafiekian became involved in various activities related to pressuring the United States to extradite the cleric. This was done in concert with a Turkish businessman and involved a shell organization to do PR and lobby. Ultimately, Rafiekian never disclosed any of these contacts to the Government as required and was charged with conspiracy and acting as a foreign agent without notifying the Attorney General. After a jury trial where he was convicted on both counts, the district court granted a motion for a judgment of acquittal, concluding that there was insufficient evidence that Rafiekian had been operating “subject to the direction or control of that foreign government.” In the alternative, the court granted Rafiekian a new trial on several grounds.

The Government appealed. As to the judgment of acquittal, the court found that there was sufficient evidence to support Rafiekian’s convictions, when the evidence was viewed in the light most favorable to the Government. The court also vacated the grant of a new trial because it was only based on the district court’s erroneous conclusion as to the sufficiency of the evidence. The court remanded, noting that “the district court may have additional justifications for its decision.” On remand, the district court again granted the motion for a new trial, based largely on its conclusion that the jury had erroneously drawn certain inferences from witness testimony presented at trial.

On appeal, a divided Fourth Circuit affirmed the grant of a new trial. The court explained that the analysis of trial evidence is different when deciding whether to grant a new trial than it was when resolving a request for a judgment of acquittal. In the latter, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, including any inferences that could be drawn by the jury. By contrast, in ruling on a new trial motion, a district court can disagree with the jury’s weighing of the evidence when determining whether the “evidence weighs so heavily against the verdict that it would be unjust to enter judgment.” Reviewing the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion (such review couldn’t take place at all until 1984), the court found no such abuse in the district court’s decision. It rejected the Government’s argument that a new trial decision could not be based “solely on” the district court’s “disagreement with the jury’s inferences of guilt.” Ultimately, what matters is “not what kinds of evidence support the verdict, but the weight of that evidence.” In a case like this, where there was no metaphorical “smoking gun,” the Government’s “case relied on the jury’s drawing inferences of guilty,” leaving the district court “no choice but to examine those inferences in considering the new-trial motion.”

Judge Niemeyer dissented, arguing that the district court “failed to give any weight to some especially material evidence presented” by the Government that supported the jury’s inferences.