No Prosecutorial Vindictiveness for Superseding Indictment With More Serious Offense Filed After Defense Suppression Win

US v. Villa: Villa was suspected of dealing drugs and, after a period of surveillance, was pulled over by police. Searches of his car and home uncovered evidence of drug trafficking. Villa volunteered that he was not a US citizen, explaining that he had been in the country since he was 17. After arrest on state charges, Villa was initially charged via a complaint with possession of a firearm as an illegal alien and illegal reentry. A pretrial services report showed a prior administrative illegal reentry charge (although no resolution) and prior drug convictions. Villa was then indicted, but only on the firearm charge. He filed a motion to suppress which lingered for months until Villa asserted his speedy trial rights. The magistrate judge recommended partially granting Villa’s motion and the district court adopted that recommendation.

While objections to the magistrate’s recommendation were pending, the Government enlisted the Department of Homeland Security to obtain additional evidence as to Villa’s immigration status. At that point, evidence showed that Villa had been previously removed from the United states. The Government obtained a separate indictment charging Villa with illegal reentry following an aggravated felony – 14 months after his arrest, but only days after obtaining the new information – and then dismissed the firearm charge. The new charge carried a statutory maximum twice as long as the firearm charge. The district court denied Villa’s motion to dismiss on prosecutorial vindictiveness grounds and as violation of his speedy trial rights and convicted Villa at a bench trial, sentencing him to 42 months in prison.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Villa’s conviction. As to vindictiveness, the court rejected Villa’s argument to apply a presumption of vindictiveness “in all cases where a defendant receives a favorable suppression ruling and the prosecutor obtains a new or superseding indictment resulting in greater sentencing exposure,” concluding that “these circumstances do not pose a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness.” That is because when the Government obtained evidence to support a new charge, it obtained a new indictment without delay. In addition, this was not a case where the new charge was rooted in the same conduct as the charge to which the suppression motion applied. As to Villa’s right to a speedy trial, the court first determined that the proper starting point for the Speedy Trial Act was when the new indictment was obtained, as it did not relate back to his initial arrest. That made his trial timely under the Act, as well as the Sixth Amendment.