US v. Proctor: In 2004, Proctor was convicted of possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine and being a felon in possession of a firearm. On the firearm charge he was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act, partly due to a prior Maryland conviction for assault with intent to prevent lawful apprehension, which was deemed a “violent felony.” He was sentenced to concurrent sentences of 292 months in prison, reduced to 240 months in 2020 under the First Step Act. In the interim, Proctor filed a 2255 motion arguing that his Maryland conviction was no longer a violent felony because assault can be committed with “no more than de minimis touching of someone in order to prevent arrest.” The district court denied the motion, holding that actual prosecutions in Maryland “consistently involved the exercise of more than de minimis force” and that state courts had identified the offense as a “crime of violence.”
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Proctor’s 2255 motion. The court agreed with Proctor that the least serious conduct that violated the statute involved simple battery, which the Fourth Circuit had “repeatedly held . . . in Maryland is not a violent felony.” The court rejected the Government’s argument that the state legislature did not intend to incorporate the common-law meaning of assault into the statute, noting it failed to point to any case giving assault or battery such an “elevated meaning.” In addition, state courts had held that “assault” in this context incorporated the common-law definition. Nor does the presence of an additional element – that the assault be committed with the intent to prevent lawful detention – change the ultimate conclusion. Finally, the court identified Maryland court decisions stating that Proctor’s offense could be committed with slight physical contact.
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