Federal Murder Statute Is Divisible, Mostly a Crime of Violence

US v. Jackson: Jackson kidnapped a runner in a national forest in North Carolina, duct taping her to a tree then raping her, before shooting her in the head. He was convicted of murder in state court and sentenced to death, but his convictions were overturned due to police misconduct. After a remand, he pleaded guilty to lesser offenses and was sentenced to 25 to 31 years in prison. He was then charged federally with using a firearm during a crime of violence that resulted in death. He was convicted and sentence to death. Jackson filed a post-Johnson 2255 motion, arguing that the “crimes of violence” relied upon by the jury in convicting were no longer crimes of violence after Johnson. The district court denied Jackson’s motion because although kidnapping was no longer a crime of violence, the other two involved – murder and aggravated sexual abuse – were. 

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of Jackson’s 2255 motion. Because the conviction only required one predicate crime of violence, the court only determined whether first-degree murder is a crime of violence. The court agreed with the Government that the first-degree murder statute is divisible, a conclusion supported by the indictment and jury instructions in Jackson’s case. Applying the modified categorical approach, the court concluded that the jury unanimously found Jackson had committed both premeditated and felony murder and that at least premeditate murder is a crime of violence. As a result, Jackson’s conviction was still supported by a properly found crime of violence.