Compassionate Release Denial Based on Full Consideration of Sentencing Factors

US v. Bethea: In 2015, Bethea pleaded guilty to various drug offenses and was ultimately sentenced (after an appeal) to 188 months in prison. Bethea eventually moved for compassionate release, arguing (as relevant to this appeal) that his medical conditions left him particularly susceptible to a severe case of COVID-19. The district court denied the request. In doing so, it noted that Bethea had been fully immunized and that the applicable sentence factors did not support release, particularly that while awaiting sentencing on home confinement Bethea had continued selling drugs.

On appeal, The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of Bethea’s request for compassionate release. First, the court concluded that the district court did not apply a per se rule preventing Bethea from obtaining compassionate release because he was vaccinated. Rather, his “vaccination status was far from the only factor that the district court considered.” The court also concluded that the district court’s consideration of the relevant sentencing factors was sufficient, particular because the motion was denied at the same hearing where Bethea had just been resentenced following his appeal.

US Court Retained Jurisdiction of Supervised Release Term of Prisoner Returned to Mexico

US v. Rios: Rios was convicted of a drug conspiracy and sentenced to 121 months in prison, followed by a 5-year term of supervised release. Four years into his term of imprisonment he was deported to Mexico, pursuant to a treaty, to serve the rest of his sentence. After he was released, he illegally reentered the United States and was convicted of that offense. In addition, his probation officer sought to revoke his original term of supervised release. Rios was sentenced to another 24-month term of imprisonment, with the district court concluded that he had received “very lenient treatment” due to the deportation and that he “essentially stuck a thumb in the eye of the American authorities by saying I’m coming back before I’m even supposed to be out of prison.”

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the revocation of Rios’ term of supervised release. Rios argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction over him because of the terms of the treaty under which he was deported. The treaty provided that the “laws and procedures” of the receiving state (Mexico, in this case)  govern the rest of an inmate’s sentence, including “provisions for . . . conditional release.” Thus, only a Mexican court had authority to deal with his term of supervised release. The court rejected that argument, concluding that the provision only meant that Mexican law controlled conditions of confinement and early release, but did not strip the United States of any jurisdiction related to the sentence.

No Ineffective Assistance of Counsel for Failing to File Losing Motion to Suppress

US v. Taylor: Taylor was involved in the trafficking of marijuana from Arizona to Maryland. He involvement was uncovered partly due to the Government’s obtaining of cellphone-related records pursuant to the Stored Communications Act and the Rules of Criminal Procedure. That information led to a GPS tracking warrant and, eventually, search warrants which were executed on various properties. Taylor was convicted at trial on multiple drug offenses and sentenced to 144 months in prison. She then filed a 2255 motion arguing that her trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to move to suppress the evidence found as a result of the warrants. The district court denied the motion, concluding that any motion to suppress would not have been successful.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed. While noting that the law in the area of how and when the Government can obtain cellphone data has been in flux, at the time of these operations it had complied with applicable statutory and regulatory provisions. As a result, any motion to suppress would have been subject to a good faith analysis and would have been denied. As the evidence would have been admissible, there was no ineffective assistance of counsel based on not trying to suppress it.