US v. MacDonald: MacDonald was convicted in 1979 of murdering his wife and two daughters at Fort Bragg in 1970. He has steadfastly maintained his innocence. In 2006, he filed (with permission from the Fourth Circuit) a successive 2255 motion asserting a due process claim of newly discovered evidence with regards to a former US Deputy Marshal named Britt ("Britt claim"). Britt stated that he was present when the prosecutor at MacDonald's trial interviewed another potential suspect (and defense witness) and threatened her with being prosecuted for the murders if the testified consistently with what she told him. Shortly thereafter, results of DNA testing (authorized by the Fourth Circuit in 1997!) became available. MacDonald (without permission) added a claim of actual innocence based on the results of the DNA tests ("DNA claim"). He also urged the district court to consider the DNA evidence as part of the "evidence as a whole" in resolving the Britt claim. The district court denied relief. As to the DNA claim, the court found it lacked jurisdiction because MacDonald failed to get permission to file that claim. As to the Britt claim, after a "more searching" analysis than the Fourth Circuit made, the court denied MacDonald leave to file the new 2255 motion.
The Fourth Circuit (a two-judge panel, due to the death of Judge Michael after oral argument) reversed and remanded for further consideration of both claims. As to the Britt claim, the court found that the district court applied the standard of review applicable to review of state convictions, rather than federal ones. While the standards were very similar, the court remanded for reconsideration rather than find the error be harmless because "the court committed prejudicial error by taking an overly restrictive view of what constitutes the 'evidence as a whole'" by not expanding the record to consider evidence received after trial and MacDonald's initial 2255 petition. The district court erred by limiting its review to only the trial record and the specific newly presented evidence of the Britt claim. As to the DNA claim, the court concluded that the district court had jurisdiction over it because it was properly added to an otherwise authorized successive motion. The court did not reach the substance of either of MacDonald's new claims.
Case summaries and analysis from Federal Defender Offices located in the Fourth Circuit (WV, VA, MD, NC, SC)
Wednesday, April 20, 2011
Flight Tolls Supervised Release Term
US v. Buchanan: Buchanan started his five-year term of supervised release in 1993. He was allowed to relocate to Ohio, but his supervision continued out of the Eastern District of Virginia. In 1994, he was indicted on state drug charges in Ohio. When his trial started in 1995, Buchanan was a no show. His probation officer in Virginia filed a petition to revoke Buchanan's supervised release and a warrant was issued. Years passed, until Buchanan was located and arrested in Georgia in 2008. After his arrest, the probation officer in Virginia filed two addenda to the petition to revoke. Buchanan moved to dismiss the addenda, as they were filed after his five-year term had expired. The district court held that the term was tolled while Buchanan was on the lam, revoked his supervised release, and sentenced him to concurrent sentences of 48, 36, and 27 months on the petition and two addenda.*
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court. The court noted that the supervised release statute does not address whether a term tolls while a supervisee is AWOL, if no petition/warrant is issued during the supervised release term. For the First Circuit, that means it does not toll. For the Ninth, it read into the statute a tolling mechanism in order to avoid providing supervisees with a reason to abscond. The Fourth Circuit followed the Ninth (I can't believe I actually wrote that!), holding that to do otherwise would foil congressional intent and reward absconders.
* This completely baffles me. In every supervised release case I've seen, there's only been one sentence per SR term, not one per violation (or batch of violations). Since Buchanan didn't challenge the initial petition, which was the basis of the 48-month term, the Fourth Circuit could have dismissed the appeal under the "concurrent sentence doctrine" but declined to do so.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court. The court noted that the supervised release statute does not address whether a term tolls while a supervisee is AWOL, if no petition/warrant is issued during the supervised release term. For the First Circuit, that means it does not toll. For the Ninth, it read into the statute a tolling mechanism in order to avoid providing supervisees with a reason to abscond. The Fourth Circuit followed the Ninth (I can't believe I actually wrote that!), holding that to do otherwise would foil congressional intent and reward absconders.
* This completely baffles me. In every supervised release case I've seen, there's only been one sentence per SR term, not one per violation (or batch of violations). Since Buchanan didn't challenge the initial petition, which was the basis of the 48-month term, the Fourth Circuit could have dismissed the appeal under the "concurrent sentence doctrine" but declined to do so.
Court Affirms Threatening Mail Convictions for Letters to USMS
US v. Rendelman: Rendelman went to trial (pro se) on six counts of mailing threatening communications under 18 USC 876(c). The threat in Count Two was directed specifically at the president, while the threat in Count Seven (one count of the indictment was dismissed before trial) was directed against the president and "all White House employees." Both counts involved letters sent to the US Marshal's Service while Rendelman was incarcerated. He was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 180 months in prison, including an enhanced 120-month term on Count Seven (in which the stat max was doubled because of the threat to White House employees).
On appeal, Rendelman (no longer pro se) raised several challenges to Counts Two and Seven, which the Fourth Circuit rejected. First, he argued that both counts were fatally defective for failing to allege violations of the statute. As to Count Two, the court rejected Rendelman's argument that the USMS is not a "person" under 876(c), holding that Count Two alleged the fundamental elements of the offense: mailing, threat, and mens rea. The same argument met the same fate on Count Seven, which also set forth the element triggering the enhanced statutory maximum. Second, the court rejected Rendelman's argument that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions, including the jury's determination that the Count Seven enhancement had been triggered. Finally, the court rejected, with little discussion, his argument that the charges had been constructively amended at trial.
On appeal, Rendelman (no longer pro se) raised several challenges to Counts Two and Seven, which the Fourth Circuit rejected. First, he argued that both counts were fatally defective for failing to allege violations of the statute. As to Count Two, the court rejected Rendelman's argument that the USMS is not a "person" under 876(c), holding that Count Two alleged the fundamental elements of the offense: mailing, threat, and mens rea. The same argument met the same fate on Count Seven, which also set forth the element triggering the enhanced statutory maximum. Second, the court rejected Rendelman's argument that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions, including the jury's determination that the Count Seven enhancement had been triggered. Finally, the court rejected, with little discussion, his argument that the charges had been constructively amended at trial.
Friday, March 18, 2011
One to watch
On Wednesday, March 23, 2011, the Fourth Circuit will hear argument in the case, US v. Maurice Williams, No. 10-4368, considering whether the district court erred in imposing the mandatory minimum term on crack cocaine in light of the FSA and a 5-year consecutive term on a Sect. 924(c) count.
Thursday, March 10, 2011
The case for changing your email password
United States v. Blauvelt: Blauvelt appealed from his convictions for possession and production of child porn, as well as possession of cocaine and two counts of distributing controlled substances to minors. Blauvelt received a 293-month sentence. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, with the Honorable Sandra Day O'Connor sitting by designation as an Associate Justice.
Factually, Blauvelt's former girlfriends, Anne Bridges and Erin Ruley, had a phone conversation, in which Bridges revealed that she had received an email from Blauvelt that contained explicit images of Ruley's 14-year-old sister, B.R. Bridges reportedly deleted the email, but she recalled Blauvelt's email account password and used it to open Blauvelt's email account, accessed the images, and showed them to Ruley. Ruley recognized both her younger sister and the interior of Blauvelt's home depicted in the photos. Bridges supplied Ruley with the email password, and Ruley went to her mother's home, printed out the photos and a screen shot of Blauvelt's email inbox, which demonstrated that the explicit photos were taken with Blauvelt's cell phone and were forwarded to his email account.
Ruley's mother called police, who then interviewed her, Ruley, and B.R., who confirmed that she was the girl in the photos. T.J., a minor male who also appears in the photos, arrived and gave statements to the police, incriminating Blauvelt. The police went to Blauvelt's home, and secured the residence while waiting for a search warrant to be signed. When the rest of the investigative team arrived with the warrant, Blauvelt was given his Miranda warnings, and he waived these rights. Blauvelt then gave statements to police; infamously, he said "oops." Officers seized his cell phone, a desktop computer, a media storage card, a digital camera, a mirror and a straw.
On appeal, Blauvelt made numerous challenges, starting with the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant (for lack of probable cause), to the denial of his request for a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, to the legality of his detention for three hours prior to the issuance of the search warrant, to the improper admission of some bad acts evidence under Rule 404(b), the imposition of a two-level obstruction of justice enhancement, and jury tampering. The Fourth Circuit showed little trouble rejecting each of these arguments and affirming the convictions.
Factually, Blauvelt's former girlfriends, Anne Bridges and Erin Ruley, had a phone conversation, in which Bridges revealed that she had received an email from Blauvelt that contained explicit images of Ruley's 14-year-old sister, B.R. Bridges reportedly deleted the email, but she recalled Blauvelt's email account password and used it to open Blauvelt's email account, accessed the images, and showed them to Ruley. Ruley recognized both her younger sister and the interior of Blauvelt's home depicted in the photos. Bridges supplied Ruley with the email password, and Ruley went to her mother's home, printed out the photos and a screen shot of Blauvelt's email inbox, which demonstrated that the explicit photos were taken with Blauvelt's cell phone and were forwarded to his email account.
Ruley's mother called police, who then interviewed her, Ruley, and B.R., who confirmed that she was the girl in the photos. T.J., a minor male who also appears in the photos, arrived and gave statements to the police, incriminating Blauvelt. The police went to Blauvelt's home, and secured the residence while waiting for a search warrant to be signed. When the rest of the investigative team arrived with the warrant, Blauvelt was given his Miranda warnings, and he waived these rights. Blauvelt then gave statements to police; infamously, he said "oops." Officers seized his cell phone, a desktop computer, a media storage card, a digital camera, a mirror and a straw.
On appeal, Blauvelt made numerous challenges, starting with the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant (for lack of probable cause), to the denial of his request for a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, to the legality of his detention for three hours prior to the issuance of the search warrant, to the improper admission of some bad acts evidence under Rule 404(b), the imposition of a two-level obstruction of justice enhancement, and jury tampering. The Fourth Circuit showed little trouble rejecting each of these arguments and affirming the convictions.
Wednesday, March 09, 2011
Convictions affirmed, Circuit split joined
US v. Halstead: Halstead was convicted of healthcare fraud and conspiring to launder money, and he received a sentence of 151 months. After his direct appeals failed, Halstead filed a petition for the collateral review of his convictions, attempting to vacate the money laundering conviction. Halstead wanted the Fourth Circuit to find a "merger problem" resolved by the Supreme Court in United States v. Santos, so that his money laundering conviction would be vacated, and dramatically reduce the jail time he could expect.
The Fourth Circuit decides here that Santos does not apply, because the charging documents for Halstead's convictions adequately defined his crimes as separate transactions not subject to merger. Indeed, affirming Halstead's convictions was a sideshow in comparison to the main event in this case, in which the Fourth Circuit joins a circuit split on the correct reading of the Santos holding.
The Fourth Circuit joins the 1st and 8th Circuits, finding that Santos requires the solution that when a merger problem arises in the context of money laundering coupled with illegal gambling, the proceeds of the illegal gambling business are its net profits. When the merger problem rears its ugly head outside of this context, e.g. when a case involves money laundering with some predicate crime other than illegal gamblng, the solution depends on a case-by-case analysis, with a consideration of the legislative history of the predicate offense.
The Fourth Circuit decides here that Santos does not apply, because the charging documents for Halstead's convictions adequately defined his crimes as separate transactions not subject to merger. Indeed, affirming Halstead's convictions was a sideshow in comparison to the main event in this case, in which the Fourth Circuit joins a circuit split on the correct reading of the Santos holding.
The Fourth Circuit joins the 1st and 8th Circuits, finding that Santos requires the solution that when a merger problem arises in the context of money laundering coupled with illegal gambling, the proceeds of the illegal gambling business are its net profits. When the merger problem rears its ugly head outside of this context, e.g. when a case involves money laundering with some predicate crime other than illegal gamblng, the solution depends on a case-by-case analysis, with a consideration of the legislative history of the predicate offense.
Monday, March 07, 2011
Army Board decision on application for discharge reinstated
Kanai v. McHugh: Kanai, a West Point cadet in his final year, sought a discharge from the Army as a conscientious objector. The Department of the Army Conscientious Objector Board denied Kanai's application on the basis that he failed to demonstrate sincerely-held beliefs entitling him to conscientious objector status. The Army subsequently relieved Kanai of his duties at West Point; Kanai went home to Maryland and filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2241. The district court granted Kanai's petition, and the Army appealed.
In determining whether the district court had jurisdiction to hear Kanai's habeas petition, the Fourth Circuit was presented with a question the federal courts have not yet resolved: where should habeas suits be filed when the petitioner is not in jail? The Fourth Circuit sidestepped the challenge to formally resolve the precise meaning of the phrase, "within their respective jurisdictions," in section 2241(a), finding instead that this statutory language "identifies the proper location of the federal district court in which a habeas petition should be filed," rejecting a subject-matter jurisdiction analysis (in accordance with the Supreme Court's holding in Rumsfeld v. Padilla). Additionally, the Fourth Circuit states that any challenge based on this language is waived if not asserted at the district court. Since the Army did not assert a jurisdictional challenge until its appeal, the Fourth Circuit deemed it waived.
On the merits of whether the Army Board had a basis to deny Kanai's application for discharge as a conscientious objector, the Fourth Circuit decided against Kanai, though it remarked favorably on him as "contemplative, self-reflective, and honest." The standard of review for the Army Board's decision required the Fourth Circuit to uphold the denial if it were supported by a "basis in fact." Such a basis exists when "conflicting inferences can be drawn from the same evidence." The Fourth Circuit held that three members of the Army Board's five-member panel appropriately found that Kanai had not presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate his "moral opposition to all wars." On this narrow standard of review, it upheld the Army Board's denial of Kanai's application for discharge.
In determining whether the district court had jurisdiction to hear Kanai's habeas petition, the Fourth Circuit was presented with a question the federal courts have not yet resolved: where should habeas suits be filed when the petitioner is not in jail? The Fourth Circuit sidestepped the challenge to formally resolve the precise meaning of the phrase, "within their respective jurisdictions," in section 2241(a), finding instead that this statutory language "identifies the proper location of the federal district court in which a habeas petition should be filed," rejecting a subject-matter jurisdiction analysis (in accordance with the Supreme Court's holding in Rumsfeld v. Padilla). Additionally, the Fourth Circuit states that any challenge based on this language is waived if not asserted at the district court. Since the Army did not assert a jurisdictional challenge until its appeal, the Fourth Circuit deemed it waived.
On the merits of whether the Army Board had a basis to deny Kanai's application for discharge as a conscientious objector, the Fourth Circuit decided against Kanai, though it remarked favorably on him as "contemplative, self-reflective, and honest." The standard of review for the Army Board's decision required the Fourth Circuit to uphold the denial if it were supported by a "basis in fact." Such a basis exists when "conflicting inferences can be drawn from the same evidence." The Fourth Circuit held that three members of the Army Board's five-member panel appropriately found that Kanai had not presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate his "moral opposition to all wars." On this narrow standard of review, it upheld the Army Board's denial of Kanai's application for discharge.
Thursday, March 03, 2011
Vitalizing the exclusionary rule
US v. Foster: Foster pled guilty to one count of possession with intent to deliver cocaine after police officers discovered drugs and some paraphernalia during an investigative stop. Foster reserved the right to appeal the denial of a suppression motion in which he argued that the officers lacked a reasonable suspicion to make the stop.
In a felicitous turn for Foster, the Fourth Circuit on appeal expresses its dismay at what it characterizes as "Government attempts to spin these largely mundane acts into a web of deception," finding a lack of articulable facts to support the district court's finding of reasonable suspicion sufficient to support the investigative stop, and vacates Foster's conviction.
Remarking on the similarity of this case to the factual scenario of US v. Sprinkle, in which the court held officers had unlawfully seized a driver with a known criminal record and his passenger while the two were huddled together in a car parked in a high crime area, the Fourth Circuit here chides the Government for making sinister the actions of Foster in a parked SUV: Foster sat up swiftly from a crouched position in the front passenger seat as a detective walked towards the vehicle; and Foster's "frenzied" arm movements directed towards the floor of the car. In its evaluation of the totality of the circumstances, the Fourth Circuit decided that the defendant's behavior, observed at some distance by the off-duty detective, in the middle of the day, in a parking lot near a restaurant where the detective had just lunched with his wife, could not have supplied the requisite reasonable suspicion necessary for a Terry stop. The Fourth Circuit concludes by advising the Government against a reliance upon "ad hoc rationalizations to validate those seizures that happen to turn up contraband."
Please use this case for the colorful judicial invective in such quotes as "we find it particularly disingenuous of the Government to attempt to portray these arm movements as ominous," and "we note our concern about the inclination of the Government toward using whatever facts are present, no matter how innocent, as indicia of suspicious activity." Bookmark this case for your next motion to suppress, folks.
In a felicitous turn for Foster, the Fourth Circuit on appeal expresses its dismay at what it characterizes as "Government attempts to spin these largely mundane acts into a web of deception," finding a lack of articulable facts to support the district court's finding of reasonable suspicion sufficient to support the investigative stop, and vacates Foster's conviction.
Remarking on the similarity of this case to the factual scenario of US v. Sprinkle, in which the court held officers had unlawfully seized a driver with a known criminal record and his passenger while the two were huddled together in a car parked in a high crime area, the Fourth Circuit here chides the Government for making sinister the actions of Foster in a parked SUV: Foster sat up swiftly from a crouched position in the front passenger seat as a detective walked towards the vehicle; and Foster's "frenzied" arm movements directed towards the floor of the car. In its evaluation of the totality of the circumstances, the Fourth Circuit decided that the defendant's behavior, observed at some distance by the off-duty detective, in the middle of the day, in a parking lot near a restaurant where the detective had just lunched with his wife, could not have supplied the requisite reasonable suspicion necessary for a Terry stop. The Fourth Circuit concludes by advising the Government against a reliance upon "ad hoc rationalizations to validate those seizures that happen to turn up contraband."
Please use this case for the colorful judicial invective in such quotes as "we find it particularly disingenuous of the Government to attempt to portray these arm movements as ominous," and "we note our concern about the inclination of the Government toward using whatever facts are present, no matter how innocent, as indicia of suspicious activity." Bookmark this case for your next motion to suppress, folks.
Wednesday, February 23, 2011
Harp Still Controls Analysis of NC Priors
US v. Simmons: Simmons pleaded guilty to three drug charges after the Government filed an information under 21 USC 851 to enhance his sentence based on a prior conviction. The prior at issue is a 1996 North Carolina conviction for possession with intent. Under North Carolina law, which ties statutory sentencing maximums to criminal history, Simmons could not have been sentenced to a term of more than 12 months in prison for that offense, as needed to trigger the 851 provisions. However, someone with the worst possible criminal history could have received such a sentence. Under Fourth Circuit law at the time of his sentencing, the conviction therefore triggered the provisions of 851.
After Simmons's sentence was affirmed on appeal, the Supreme Court GVR'd in light of Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder. On remand, the Fourth Circuit held that Carachuri-Rosendo did not undermine the earlier circuit precedent and again affirmed the sentence. Specifically, the court rejected Simmons's argument that Carachuri-Rosendo required the court to abandon its "hypothetic defendant" analysis when examining prior convictions. The court held that the difference in statutory language between the immigration laws at issue in Carachuri-Rosendo and 851 showed the rule of Carachuri-Rosendo could not be imported into the 851 context. Carachuri-Rosendo was simply "inapplicable to our present inquiry." The court also rejected Simmons's argument with regards to whether his prior conviction was obtained in violation of his right to counsel.
UPDATE: See here, reversed en banc.
After Simmons's sentence was affirmed on appeal, the Supreme Court GVR'd in light of Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder. On remand, the Fourth Circuit held that Carachuri-Rosendo did not undermine the earlier circuit precedent and again affirmed the sentence. Specifically, the court rejected Simmons's argument that Carachuri-Rosendo required the court to abandon its "hypothetic defendant" analysis when examining prior convictions. The court held that the difference in statutory language between the immigration laws at issue in Carachuri-Rosendo and 851 showed the rule of Carachuri-Rosendo could not be imported into the 851 context. Carachuri-Rosendo was simply "inapplicable to our present inquiry." The court also rejected Simmons's argument with regards to whether his prior conviction was obtained in violation of his right to counsel.
UPDATE: See here, reversed en banc.
Harmless Error Analysis for Guideline Miscalculation
US v. Savillon-Matute: Savillon-Matute pleaded guilty to illegal reentry. Prior to sentencing, the probation officer recommended an 8-level enhancement because Savillon-Matute's prior Maryland conviction for second-degree assault was an "aggravated felony." The Government objected, arguing that a 16-level enhancement was applicable because that prior offense was a "crime of violence" because the victim was seven years old and force was involved. Savillon-Matute argued that neither enhancement applied. At sentencing, the district court agreed with Savillon-Matute that his Maryland conviction was not a crime of violence, but took judicial notice that the charging documents made the age of the victim and use of force clear. The 8-level enhancement was applied. However, Savillon-Matute was sentenced to 36 months in prison, twice the top of the advisory Guideline range.
On appeal, Savillon-Matute argued that his sentence was unreasonable because the district court incorrectly calculated the advisory Guideline range by using documents outside the scope of those allowed by Shepard to determine the victim's age and use of force. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the sentence, refusing to "wad[e] into the morass of how to apply Shepard in the particular circumstances of this case" because any error in calculating the Guidelines was harmless. Adopting the logic of an 11th Circuit case, the court held that "it would make no sense to set aside [a] reasonable sentence and send the case back to the district court since it has already told us that it would impose exactly the same sentence, a sentence we would be compelled to affirm." Looking to the statements of the district court in this case, the court concluded that the same sentence would have been applied regardless of the Guideline calculation.
On appeal, Savillon-Matute argued that his sentence was unreasonable because the district court incorrectly calculated the advisory Guideline range by using documents outside the scope of those allowed by Shepard to determine the victim's age and use of force. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the sentence, refusing to "wad[e] into the morass of how to apply Shepard in the particular circumstances of this case" because any error in calculating the Guidelines was harmless. Adopting the logic of an 11th Circuit case, the court held that "it would make no sense to set aside [a] reasonable sentence and send the case back to the district court since it has already told us that it would impose exactly the same sentence, a sentence we would be compelled to affirm." Looking to the statements of the district court in this case, the court concluded that the same sentence would have been applied regardless of the Guideline calculation.
No Suppression Required for ECPA Violation
US v. Clenney: Clenney pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The firearm was discovered during a search of his home subsequent to his arrest on state extortion charges. The extortion investigation led officers to Clenney's home. Clenney sought to suppress the gun (and his statement admitting it was his), but the district court denied his motion. He preserved the issue for appeal.
On appeal, Clenney offered two arguments as to why the evidence against him should be suppressed, both of which the Fourth Circuit rejected. First, Clenney argued that the evidence should have been suppressed under Franks due to inaccurate information presented in the applications for the warrants as well as information intentionally left out in order to mislead the issuing judge. The court disagreed, noting that the assertions that Clenney claimed were inaccurate were actually accurate and that the information withheld from the magistrate was not material and would not have changed the probable cause determination.
Second, Clenney argued that information obtained from his cell phone during the search was obtained in violation of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and Virginia law. The court held that, although the information retrieved from Clenney's phone was covered by those provisions, he had failed to prove it was obtained without following the procedures set forth for obtaining them. In addition, the court held that suppression was not available as a remedy for such a violation because neither of the statutes provided for suppression.
Finally, the court briefly turned away arguments that Clenney's Miranda waiver was not valid and that he was not promptly presented to a magistrate following his arrest.
On appeal, Clenney offered two arguments as to why the evidence against him should be suppressed, both of which the Fourth Circuit rejected. First, Clenney argued that the evidence should have been suppressed under Franks due to inaccurate information presented in the applications for the warrants as well as information intentionally left out in order to mislead the issuing judge. The court disagreed, noting that the assertions that Clenney claimed were inaccurate were actually accurate and that the information withheld from the magistrate was not material and would not have changed the probable cause determination.
Second, Clenney argued that information obtained from his cell phone during the search was obtained in violation of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and Virginia law. The court held that, although the information retrieved from Clenney's phone was covered by those provisions, he had failed to prove it was obtained without following the procedures set forth for obtaining them. In addition, the court held that suppression was not available as a remedy for such a violation because neither of the statutes provided for suppression.
Finally, the court briefly turned away arguments that Clenney's Miranda waiver was not valid and that he was not promptly presented to a magistrate following his arrest.
District Court Must Allow Defendant to Withdraw Plea When It Overrides Mandatory Provision
US v. Lewis: Lewis entered into an agreement with the Government to plead guilty to one count of witness tampering (another of those counts and a felon in possession charge would be dropped). Part of the plea agreement stated that the "parties agree that this sentence of imprisonment shall be served concurrent with the state sentence [Lewis] is currently serving . . .." At the plea hearing, the district court explained that it was not bound by any "recommendations" in the plea agreement and that Lewis might be sentenced more severely than the agreement contemplated. Although the district court explained that some agreements could be withdrawn from if the district court did not accept it, this was not one of those agreements. At sentencing, the district court imposed a sentence of 46 months, to be served consecutively to the undercharged state sentence "over the defendant's objection."
On appeal, Lewis argued (first in a pro se brief filed as part of the Anders process and then by subsequent counsel) that the plea agreement with regards to the concurrent/consecutive sentence issue had been breached. The Fourth Circuit agreed. The primary issue, the court said, was whether the plea agreement provision about the concurrent/consecutive sentencing issue made the plea a "binding" one under Rule 11(c)(1)(C). If so, then Lewis should have been allowed to withdraw the plea if the district court would not accept it. If not, Lewis was stuck. The court "readily rejected" the Government's argument (which it also called "nearly frivolous") that the agreement was not meant to be an 11(c)(1)(C) agreement, noting that the concurrent/consecutive sentence provision was phrased in mandatory terms, where other provisions were not. Furthermore, the district court's "conditional approval" at the plea hearing strongly suggested it was that type of plea. Therefore, when the district court did finally reject the agreement, by sentencing Lewis to a consecutive term, it erred by not allowing him to withdraw from the agreement. Because the error was not harmless, the court vacated Lewis's sentence and remanded the case for further proceedings.
On appeal, Lewis argued (first in a pro se brief filed as part of the Anders process and then by subsequent counsel) that the plea agreement with regards to the concurrent/consecutive sentence issue had been breached. The Fourth Circuit agreed. The primary issue, the court said, was whether the plea agreement provision about the concurrent/consecutive sentencing issue made the plea a "binding" one under Rule 11(c)(1)(C). If so, then Lewis should have been allowed to withdraw the plea if the district court would not accept it. If not, Lewis was stuck. The court "readily rejected" the Government's argument (which it also called "nearly frivolous") that the agreement was not meant to be an 11(c)(1)(C) agreement, noting that the concurrent/consecutive sentence provision was phrased in mandatory terms, where other provisions were not. Furthermore, the district court's "conditional approval" at the plea hearing strongly suggested it was that type of plea. Therefore, when the district court did finally reject the agreement, by sentencing Lewis to a consecutive term, it erred by not allowing him to withdraw from the agreement. Because the error was not harmless, the court vacated Lewis's sentence and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Resisting Arrest Is Crime of Violence Under ACCA
US v. Jenkins: Jenkins was convicted of drug distribution and being a felon in possession of a firearm, then sentenced as a career offender. One of his two prior qualifying offenses, according to the district court, was a 1998 conviction for the "Maryland common law offense of resisting arrest." In making that conclusion, the district court relied on a 2009 unpublished Fourth Circuit case, Mullen, which held that resisting arrest was a crime of violence under the Guidelines.
On appeal, Jenkins challenged his designation as a career offender, arguing that the older Fourth Circuit case upon which Mullen was based had been undermined by recent Supreme Court decisions dealing with "violent felonies" under the ACCA - Begay and Chambers. The Fourth Circuit disagreed, holding that resisting arrest is a crime of violence, even in light of Begay and Chambers, because it produces great risk of harm to others and can only be committed intentionally or purposely.
On appeal, Jenkins challenged his designation as a career offender, arguing that the older Fourth Circuit case upon which Mullen was based had been undermined by recent Supreme Court decisions dealing with "violent felonies" under the ACCA - Begay and Chambers. The Fourth Circuit disagreed, holding that resisting arrest is a crime of violence, even in light of Begay and Chambers, because it produces great risk of harm to others and can only be committed intentionally or purposely.
Monday, January 31, 2011
Court Affirms 9-Year Sentence for Conspiracy to Defraud US of Taxes
US v. Thorson: Thorson, an attorney, was involved in a complex scheme to take advantage of a charitable giving tax loophole involving cemetery plots. Over three years, the scheme netted almost $10 million in fraudulent tax deductions. Thorson came up with the legal mechanics of the scheme. For his income from the scheme, Thorson concealed his funds as loans and thus did not report it on tax returns. Then, when the IRS came to audit the partnership running the scheme, Thorson created false documents to thwart the investigation. As a result of all this, Thorson was convicted of conspiring to defraud the United States of tax income. At sentencing, Thorson was hit with enhancements for a leadership role in the offense and obstruction of justice, among others. He was sentenced to 108 months in prison.
On appeal, Thorson challenged both the procedural and substantive grounds, all of which the Fourth Circuit rejected. Procedurally, Thorson first challenged the imposition of the leadership enhancement, arguing that the evidence did not support characterizing his role in that way. The court disagreed, noting that his role was "especially significant" because of the deployment of his legal skills, that he was "critical to the recruitment of investors," and that he supervised and directed much of the paperwork needed to complete the scheme. Second, Thorson challenged the obstruction of justice enhancement, based on false documents provided to the grand jury. Thorson argued that this conduct was part of the offense of conviction and, at any rate, already covered by another enhancement for sophisticated concealment. The court disagreed, holding that the obstructive conduct continued into the criminal investigation and the enhancement was not duplicative. Finally, Thorson argued that his sentence was substantively unreasonable when compared to those received by his codefendants and others similarly situated. The court disagreed, holding that the sentence was reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances.
Judge Gregory dissented, arguing that the imposition of the two Guideline enhancements was error. He argued that the district court "took Thorson's conduct as a personal affront" and "Thorson's occupation weighed heavily on the court's mind." Regardless, the "majority today endorses" that approach "and punishes Thorson on no evidentiary basis."
On appeal, Thorson challenged both the procedural and substantive grounds, all of which the Fourth Circuit rejected. Procedurally, Thorson first challenged the imposition of the leadership enhancement, arguing that the evidence did not support characterizing his role in that way. The court disagreed, noting that his role was "especially significant" because of the deployment of his legal skills, that he was "critical to the recruitment of investors," and that he supervised and directed much of the paperwork needed to complete the scheme. Second, Thorson challenged the obstruction of justice enhancement, based on false documents provided to the grand jury. Thorson argued that this conduct was part of the offense of conviction and, at any rate, already covered by another enhancement for sophisticated concealment. The court disagreed, holding that the obstructive conduct continued into the criminal investigation and the enhancement was not duplicative. Finally, Thorson argued that his sentence was substantively unreasonable when compared to those received by his codefendants and others similarly situated. The court disagreed, holding that the sentence was reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances.
Judge Gregory dissented, arguing that the imposition of the two Guideline enhancements was error. He argued that the district court "took Thorson's conduct as a personal affront" and "Thorson's occupation weighed heavily on the court's mind." Regardless, the "majority today endorses" that approach "and punishes Thorson on no evidentiary basis."
No Leadership Enhancement In Drug Conspiracy
US v. Slade: Slade pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine and crack. His role in the conspiracy:
On appeal, Slade argued that he should not have been subject to an enhancement for a leadership role because there was no evidence that he actually managed or supervised anyone. The Fourth Circuit agreed, holding that the facts set forth above "do not justify imposition of an enhancement for a management or supervisory role." There was no evidence that Slade "actively exercised some authority over other participants" in the conspiracy. Although reviewing for plain error, the court found the error plain, prejudicial, and worthy of notice on appeal. Therefore, the court vacated Slade's sentence (briefly turning away two other Guideline challenges) and remanded for resentencing.
According to the PSR, which the district court adopted, Slade was a 'mid[-] to upper-level' member of the drug conspiracy who sold or delivered cocaine and cocaine base both to his own clientele and to other members of the conspiracy, who, in turn, sold the drugs to their clientele. Certain coconspirators also sold cocaine and cocaine base 'for' Slade on various occasions. The PSR reveals further that an unindicted co-conspirator drove Slade to various locations to deliver cocaine base to his clients.At sentencing, the district court applied a three-level enhancement (among others) for Slade's leadership role in the offense. Slade was sentenced to 365 months in prison, the top of the advisory Guideline range.
On appeal, Slade argued that he should not have been subject to an enhancement for a leadership role because there was no evidence that he actually managed or supervised anyone. The Fourth Circuit agreed, holding that the facts set forth above "do not justify imposition of an enhancement for a management or supervisory role." There was no evidence that Slade "actively exercised some authority over other participants" in the conspiracy. Although reviewing for plain error, the court found the error plain, prejudicial, and worthy of notice on appeal. Therefore, the court vacated Slade's sentence (briefly turning away two other Guideline challenges) and remanded for resentencing.
Skipping Departure for Variance Analysis Not Procedrually Unreasonable
US v. Diosdado-Star: Diosdado-Star was deported in 2002 because he entered the country illegally. He was back within a month, using an alias that matched that of a Border Patrol agent who was under investigation for misconduct. The investigation led to Diosdado-Star, who was discovered to be posing as a Border Patrol agent to others seeking to remain in the country illegally. In the process, Diosdado-Star made about $177,000. When his home was searched, he admitted being a citizen of Mexico, the illegally reentering the US, and to impersonating an agent. As a result, Diosdado-Star was convicted of illegal reentry and possessing a counterfeit resident alien card. Although his advisory Guideline range was only four to 10 months, the district court varied and imposed a sentence of 84 months in prison.
Diosdado-Star appealed his sentence, which the Fourth Circuit affirmed. He first argued that the sentence was procedurally unreasonable, because the district court failed to consider a Guideline departure before imposing a variance sentence. The court disagreed, holding that (the method of deviation from the Guidelines range - whether by a departure or by varying - is irrelevant so long as at least one rationale is justified and reasonable." However, in a footnote, the court "offer[ed] no comment on the observation of several other circuit courts of appeal that the departure provisions of the Guidelines are obsolete." Diosdado-Star also argued that the sentence was substantively unreasonable. The court disagreed, holding that the district court's variance "while substantial, [] does not constitute an abuse of discretion based on the totality of the circumstances."
Diosdado-Star appealed his sentence, which the Fourth Circuit affirmed. He first argued that the sentence was procedurally unreasonable, because the district court failed to consider a Guideline departure before imposing a variance sentence. The court disagreed, holding that (the method of deviation from the Guidelines range - whether by a departure or by varying - is irrelevant so long as at least one rationale is justified and reasonable." However, in a footnote, the court "offer[ed] no comment on the observation of several other circuit courts of appeal that the departure provisions of the Guidelines are obsolete." Diosdado-Star also argued that the sentence was substantively unreasonable. The court disagreed, holding that the district court's variance "while substantial, [] does not constitute an abuse of discretion based on the totality of the circumstances."
Monday, January 24, 2011
"Stipulation" Entered Without Defendant's Consent Not Harmless Error
US v. Williams: Williams was charged with conspiring to possess with intent heroin. The heroin at issue was seized when it came into the country at the Louisville airport in a package. Per the Government's theory, Williams was the end recipient of the package and he would distribute the contents. Williams went to trial. At the trial, the Government presented a stipulation regarding the substance in the package - that it was approximately 98 grams of heroin. Williams refused to sign the stipulation. However, Williams's attorney suggested that she would do so, if the court would allow it. She signed the stipulation, which was read to the jury. During deliberations, the jury asked what amount of drugs was necessary to delineate personal use from distribution. The court referred them to "common sense" and provided them with a copy of the stipulation. The jury convicted Williams.
On appeal, Williams argued that the use of a stipulation without his consent violated hi Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. The Government agreed that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to allow the stipulation. However, it argued that the error was harmless. The Fourth Circuit first agreed with the parties that Williams's Sixth Amendment rights were violated. It then proceeded to analyze the evidence in the case and concluded that the error was not harmless. The court noted that the stipulation went beyond merely identifying the substance at issue as heroin - it "essentially established an element of the crime" and was used by the jury in determining whether Williams had an intent to distribute the heroin. Thus, the court vacated Williams's conviction and remanded the case to the district court.
District Judge Dever concurred with the majority on the Sixth Amendment violation, but dissented from the conclusion that the error was not harmless. He argued, after a lengthy recitation of the trial facts, that the stipulation had much less of an impact on the ultimate outcome and therefore its admission was harmless.
On appeal, Williams argued that the use of a stipulation without his consent violated hi Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. The Government agreed that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to allow the stipulation. However, it argued that the error was harmless. The Fourth Circuit first agreed with the parties that Williams's Sixth Amendment rights were violated. It then proceeded to analyze the evidence in the case and concluded that the error was not harmless. The court noted that the stipulation went beyond merely identifying the substance at issue as heroin - it "essentially established an element of the crime" and was used by the jury in determining whether Williams had an intent to distribute the heroin. Thus, the court vacated Williams's conviction and remanded the case to the district court.
District Judge Dever concurred with the majority on the Sixth Amendment violation, but dissented from the conclusion that the error was not harmless. He argued, after a lengthy recitation of the trial facts, that the stipulation had much less of an impact on the ultimate outcome and therefore its admission was harmless.
Court Affirms Multiple Searches In Wake of Shooting
US v. Allen: Allen was shot and wounded (in a shooting that left another wounded and two more dead) in front of his store in Baltimore. An officer responding to the scene followed a trail of blood into the store, to a file cabinet, which he opened. Inside was a pistol. Three search warrants were then executed: the first at the store (recovering the pistol and collecting DNA), the second to procure Allen's DNA, and the third at Allen's home. The searches showed that Allen's DNA was on the pistol found at the store and that ammunition had been recovered at Allen's home. Allen was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition.
Allen moved to suppress the evidence found as a result of all three searches and also requested a Franks hearing based on discrepancies between the affidavits for the first and second warrants. The district court denied the motions. As to the first and second warrants, the district court found that , although the pistol was not in plain view when first seen, it would have inevitably been discovered during a proper search of the crime scene. As to the third warrant, the court concluded that the warrant contained sufficient evidence to demonstrate probable cause that evidence related to the shooting would be found at Allen's home. Allen pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of ammunition and preserved his right to appeal the denial of his motions to suppress.
On appeal, Allen made three arguments, all of which the Fourth Circuit rejected. First, he argued that he should have been granted a Franks hearing due to the discrepancies between the first two warrant applications, mostly based on whether the pistol was in plain view (first) or not (second). The court concluded that, even without that information, both warrants were based on sufficient evidence to provide probable cause. Second, Allen argued that the first officer to enter the store did so outside any legitimate Fourth Amendment exception. The court concluded that, even if that entry was improper, there was sufficient evidence aside from what was initially discovered in the store to support probable cause. Finally, renewed his argument that the third warrant lacked probable cause to support a search of his home. The court disagreed.
Allen moved to suppress the evidence found as a result of all three searches and also requested a Franks hearing based on discrepancies between the affidavits for the first and second warrants. The district court denied the motions. As to the first and second warrants, the district court found that , although the pistol was not in plain view when first seen, it would have inevitably been discovered during a proper search of the crime scene. As to the third warrant, the court concluded that the warrant contained sufficient evidence to demonstrate probable cause that evidence related to the shooting would be found at Allen's home. Allen pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of ammunition and preserved his right to appeal the denial of his motions to suppress.
On appeal, Allen made three arguments, all of which the Fourth Circuit rejected. First, he argued that he should have been granted a Franks hearing due to the discrepancies between the first two warrant applications, mostly based on whether the pistol was in plain view (first) or not (second). The court concluded that, even without that information, both warrants were based on sufficient evidence to provide probable cause. Second, Allen argued that the first officer to enter the store did so outside any legitimate Fourth Amendment exception. The court concluded that, even if that entry was improper, there was sufficient evidence aside from what was initially discovered in the store to support probable cause. Finally, renewed his argument that the third warrant lacked probable cause to support a search of his home. The court disagreed.
Court Affirms Tax Evasion Conviction
US v. Cole: Cole was a real estate agent who partnered with three others to purchase commercial real estate. Cole negotiated the purchase price with the sellers and misrepresented the final amount of the sale price to his partners. The difference in the price paid and the seller's actual price demanded was absorbed by Cole, to the tune of $2 million. He also engineered a similar purchase involving a $1 million note financing one of the properties. Those funds Cole appeared to treat as sale commissions, in multiple venues. In 2005, Cole filed tax returns for 2001, 2002, and 2003 - the years during which he acquired these funds - but did not report any taxable income. He argued that the real estate money came from "assignment fees," rather than commissions, which subjected them to favorable tax treatment as capital gains. The nearly $100,000 he received from the sale of the note was omitted altogether - Cole "missed it" due to a bookkeeping error. Cole was charged and convicted of multiple counts of tax evasion and filing false tax returns.
On appeal, Cole made several arguments attacking his convictions, none of which was successful. First, the Fourth Circuit rejected his argument that the evidence was insufficient to convict him because the charges against him required "willfulness," but the commission/assignment fee distinction was "uncertain as a matter of tax law" and therefore he could not act willfully. In doing so the court declined Cole's invitation to hold that, as a matter of law, when an expert accountant testifies (without objection) to the confused nature of the tax law at issue, willfulness cannot exist as a matter of law. Second, the court concluded that, although it was error for the district court to allow introduction of evidence that Cole had lied previously on ATF forms related to firearms purchases, that error was harmless. Nor was there any error in allowing into evidence Cole's lavish spending during the time in question, as it went to his motive. Finally, the court rejected Cole's argument that the district court should have granted a continuance during trial (prior to Cole's cross-examination) due to Cole being "disoriented or incapable of focusing."
On appeal, Cole made several arguments attacking his convictions, none of which was successful. First, the Fourth Circuit rejected his argument that the evidence was insufficient to convict him because the charges against him required "willfulness," but the commission/assignment fee distinction was "uncertain as a matter of tax law" and therefore he could not act willfully. In doing so the court declined Cole's invitation to hold that, as a matter of law, when an expert accountant testifies (without objection) to the confused nature of the tax law at issue, willfulness cannot exist as a matter of law. Second, the court concluded that, although it was error for the district court to allow introduction of evidence that Cole had lied previously on ATF forms related to firearms purchases, that error was harmless. Nor was there any error in allowing into evidence Cole's lavish spending during the time in question, as it went to his motive. Finally, the court rejected Cole's argument that the district court should have granted a continuance during trial (prior to Cole's cross-examination) due to Cole being "disoriented or incapable of focusing."
Involuntary Manslaughter Not "Crime of Violence"
US v. Peterson: Peterson was convicted on multiple drug and gun counts. He was sentenced as a career offender, a status based partly on his 2001 conviction in North Carolina for involuntary manslaughter, arising from "an incident in which Peterson accidentally shot his close friend . . . while the two were playing with what they believed (mistakenly) was an unloaded pistol." Peterson objected to the career offender classification, arguing that the involuntary manslaughter conviction was not a "crime of violence" as defined by the Guidelines. The district court disagreed and sentenced him to 420 months in prison.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit agreed with Peterson and vacated his sentence. The court first concluded that generic "manslaughter" - which is specifically included in the definition of crime of violence - requires either that the defendant acted "recklessly" or "intentionally if under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance." The North Carolina offense of involuntary manslaughter did not fit within that definition because it's required mental state - "thoughtless disregard" - is a lesser requirement than recklessness, as defined by the Model Penal Code. Peterson's conviction, therefore, was not explicitly included in the definition of crime of violence. The court then turned to the issue of whether his conviction was one that "presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another" under the crime of violence definition's "otherwise" clause, concluding that it was not because the North Carolina statute covered negligent and unintentional conduct.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit agreed with Peterson and vacated his sentence. The court first concluded that generic "manslaughter" - which is specifically included in the definition of crime of violence - requires either that the defendant acted "recklessly" or "intentionally if under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance." The North Carolina offense of involuntary manslaughter did not fit within that definition because it's required mental state - "thoughtless disregard" - is a lesser requirement than recklessness, as defined by the Model Penal Code. Peterson's conviction, therefore, was not explicitly included in the definition of crime of violence. The court then turned to the issue of whether his conviction was one that "presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another" under the crime of violence definition's "otherwise" clause, concluding that it was not because the North Carolina statute covered negligent and unintentional conduct.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)