Wednesday, November 02, 2011

"Employment" Can Include, Doesn't Require, Payment of Wages

US v. Weaver: Weaver and his codefendants were members of the Pagans Motorcycle Club, which the Government alleged was involved in various nefarious activities. They were charged with "being employed" by a prohibited person and possessing a firearm "in the course of such employment." The "employer" was the president of the club, who was a convicted felon and, thus, could not legally possess firearms. The district court concluded that the statute required the Government to prove that Weaver and the others were "employed for wages," a standard which the Government admitted it could not meet. Therefore, the district court dismissed that charge.

The Government appealed and the Fourth Circuit reversed. After dealing with the procedural irregularities of the appeal (in a footnote), the court concluded that the district court's reading placed "an artificial restriction on the statute." The statute's plain language, the court concluded, does not show a "rigid requirement that defendants be hired for tangible compensation," because the word "employ" has many potential meanings. A more flexible test is appropriate and better implements the structure and purpose of the statute. However, the court declined the opportunity to set out that test in detail, remanding to the district court for further proceedings.

Wednesday, October 12, 2011

En Banc Court Addresses ACCA, Categorical Approach, and Indecent Liberties

US v. Vann: Vann was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The PSR recommended that he be classified as an Armed Career Criminal based on three prior convictions in North Carolina for "indecent liberties" (aka sex offenses against children), which were violent felonies under the ACCA. Vann objected, arguing that in a post-Begay world some indecent liberties convictions would be violent felonies, while others would not and the record did not prove that his were violent felonies. The district court and a panel of the Fourth Circuit disagreed and Vann was sentenced to 180 months in prison.

Sitting en banc, the Fourth Circuit reversed course and vacated Vann's sentence. In a brief per curiam opinion (in which nine judges joined), the court explained that it "assumed" that (applying a "modified" categorical approach) any conviction under subsection (a)(2) (as opposed to (a)(1)) of the North Carolina indecent liberties statute was a violent felony, the Government could not prove that Vann's convictions were sustained under that subsection. It rejected the conclusion of Judge Niemeyer (concurring and dissenting) that because the charging documents were worded conjunctively and cited both subsections that Vann pleaded guilty to violating both of them, holding that (a) those documents weren't part of the record before the district court and shouldn't be considered and (b) even if they were, prior circuit precedent on conjunctively worded indictments did not support the dissent's position.

That's the first 10 pages. The other 90 pages of the opinion consist of a plethora of concurrences and one dissent:
  • Judge King concurred (with three others signed on),arguing against adopting a modified version of the categorical approach, concluding that such would "contravene Supreme Court precedent and the interests of justice," although noting that the result is the same in this particular case.
  • Judge Agee concurred both with the per curiam opinion Judge Keenan's concurrence and picks up Justice Scalia's withering attack on the vagueness of the ACCA (a "black hole of confusion and uncertainty stymies our best efforts," Judge Agee writes) in Sykes, calling upon Congress to fix it, and lays the blame squarely at Congress's feet "should a majority of the Supreme Court come to find Justice Scalia's conclusion the only constitutionally valid course."
  • Judge Davis (who joined Judge King's concurrence) concurred, offering more thoughts on the perils of the modified categorical approach.
  • Judge Keenan's concurrence (to which four other judges signed on) offers a defense of the modified categorical approach.
  • Judge Wilkinson concurred, offering another defense of the modified categorical approach, noting that "too many courts are too deep in the weeds on the matter of the ACCA's residual clause."
  • Judge Niemeyer dissented (joined by Judge Shedd), arguing that the record showed that Vann's prior convictions were ACCA violent felonies. He concurred in the use of the modified categorical approach, however.
Congrats to the Defender office in the Eastern District of North Carolina on the win!

Monday, August 22, 2011

Warrantless Entry Violates Fourth Amendment, Will Later Consent Avoid Suppression?

US v. Hill: Police obtained a warrant for Hill's arrest on drug charges. They went to his last known address, a townhouse he shared with his girlfriend and their son. However, from prior experience the officers knew that Hill only spent about half of his time there and one officer speculated there was only a 20% chance he would be there (a previous visit to the home on a 911 hang-up led Hill's girlfriend to tell the officers he knew he had an arrest warrant out against him). Officers knocked on the door, but no one answered. They could hear what sounded like the TV playing inside. One officer called Hill's wife, who was at work. She said the only person who would be there was her sister. She did not give the officers' permission to enter.

Nonetheless, one of them turned the knob, opened the door, and saw Hill (and a friend) sitting on the couch. Officers did a protective search of the home, finding some marijuana. One officer went to obtain a search warrant. Before he returned, however, Hill's girlfriend arrived home. She may or may not have consented to a search of the home at that time. Regardless, a search was done by the time the warrant arrived. Officers found a gun and more drugs in the home, leading to Hill being charged with drug and firearm offenses. Hill moved to suppress the evidence, but the motion was denied. He entered a conditional guilty plea and was sentenced to 120 months in prison.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the denial of the motion to suppress. First, the court held that the officers did not have sufficient evidence to suggest that Hill was actually in the home to execute the arrest warrant. Hill conceded he resided there (he had to in order to assert a Fourth Amendment protection), but the court held there was not sufficient evidence from which the officers could conclude he was actually there. Second, the court concluded that there were no exigent circumstances present that would justify entry into the home without a warrant. Third, the court held that Hill's girlfriend did consent to a search once she arrived at the home. However, the court did not decide whether the consent dissipated the taint of the initial illegal entry, an issue the district court did not reach. It remanded to the district court for further proceedings on that issue.

Judge Agee dissented, arguing that the majority did not give sufficient deference to the district court's finding of facts. When viewed with the proper deference, there was no basis for overturning the district court's ruling.

Congrats to the Defender office in Eastern Virginia on the win!

Court Reverses on North Carolina Priors

US v. Simmons: Simmons was convicted on a federal drug charge and faced an enhanced sentence for a prior drug conviction "punishable by imprisonment for more than one year." The prior at issue was a North Carolina conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana. A "Class I" felony, it carried a potential sentence of more than one year in prison only if (a) certain aggravating factors were present and (b) Simmons had a "prior record level" of at least 5. Neither condition was met in Simmons's case. Nevertheless, the district court found that Simmons's prior qualified him for an enhanced sentence, applying an old Fourth Circuit case which held that the applicable potential maximum sentence in such cases was based on an offender with the worst possible criminal history. A panel of the Fourth Circuit affirmed that sentence, both before and after a remand from the Supreme Court.

On a rehearing en banc, the court changed course, 8-5, and vacated Simmons's sentence. The court, via Judge Motz, concluded that the Supreme Court expressly rejected the "hypothetical defendant" approach for analyzing North Carolina convictions. Because a defendant's maximum potential sentence on an offense in North Carolina is tied directly to his criminal history, the correct analysis is to determine what the maximum sentence possible a defendant with the same criminal history could have received (the actual sentence received is, of course, irrelevant). That brings the Fourth Circuit into line with the other two circuits that have looked at the North Carolina system.

Judge Agee led the dissenters, arguing that the language of the enhancement statute talks about an "offense" that is "punishable" by a certain potential sentence and does not allow for any consideration of a particular defendant's criminal history.

Congrats the Defender office in Western North Carolina, which headed up the amicus forces on this win!

Tuesday, August 16, 2011

Nervousness During Refusal to Consent to Patdown Doesn't Generate Reasonable Suspicion

US v. Massenburg: Officers in Richmond responded to an anonymous report of shots fired in a "high-crime" neighborhood. They encountered a group of four men, including Massenburg, about four blocks away. The men were generally helpful (one reported hearing shots), provided identification, and consented to patdowns. However, Massenburg refused to consent to a patdown. He was, according to one of the officers, "real reluctant to give consent." Because Massenburg distanced himself somewhat from the other three men and would not make eye contact with an officer repeatedly asking for consent to perform a patdown, an officer patted him down anyway. The patdown uncovered a gun and some marijuana, leading to Massenburg being charged with drug possession and possession of a firearm by a drug user. He moved to suppress the gun and marijuana, but the district court denied the motion. Massenburg entered a conditional guilty plea and appealed that decision.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the motion to suppress. Noting that it recently (in Foster) chided the Government for attempting to spin "mundane acts into a web of deception" in order to support a Terry intervention, the court wrote that such concern "is only heightened when the 'mundane acts' emerge from the refusal to consent to a voluntary search," concluding that, if Terry is to mean anything, "refusing to consent to a search cannot itself justify a nonconsensual search." After examining the testimony about the incident in some detail, the court concluded that "there is precious little to sustain the district court's holding" that there was reasonable suspicion to support a patdown. Massenburg's observed nervousness came only when the officer repeatedly sought his consent to pat him down, a situation that would make almost anyone nervous. The court also refused to impart to the officer who searched Massenburg the observation of another officer (not reported at the time) that he saw a bulge in Massenburg's jacket.

3582 Reduction Requires Reliance on Guidelines

US v. Brown: Brown pleaded guilty to maintaining a crack house in 2005. As part of a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) binding plea agreement, he agreed that the "appropriate sentence in this case is incarceration for not less than 180 months and not more than 240 months." He was sentenced to 210 months in prison. In 2009, Brown filed a motion for a reduced sentence under 3582(c)(2) and the revised crack guidelines. The district court granted the motion and reduced his sentence to 180 months. The Government appealed, arguing that the district court lacked the jurisdiction to reduce a sentence imposed as part of a binding plea agreement.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit agreed and vacated Brown's reduced sentence. The Supreme Court recently dealt with the issue in Freeman v, United States. However, as the Fourth recognized, that decision was not a hallmark of clarity. Four justices held that reduced sentences are always available in binding plea cases, while four others concluded (in dissent) that such reductions are never available. Justice Sotomayor took a middle approach, concluding that reductions were unavailable in such cases, unless the plea agreement specifically relies upon a particular Guideline range. Concluding that Sotomayor's opinion controls, the court concludes that Brown's plea agreement does not rely on a particular Guideline range. Therefore, the district court lacked the authority to reduce his sentence.

Identity Evidence Insufficient to Sustain Robbery, Firearm Charges

US v. Bonner: Bonner was charged with a Hobbs Act robbery and use of a firearm. The charges arose from the robbery of a Subway restaurant in North Carolina by two African American men. One was wearing a NY Yankees cap. That was the only description provided by the two employees present during the robbery. Police pulled over an SUV exiting the parking lot shortly thereafter that, while it only included one occupant (who was never charged), did contain items linking the vehicle to Bonner. Police also recovered a Yankees cap from behind the store which contained DNA that matched Bonner (as well as several other people who could not be identified). Finally, a canine followed a scent from the area to a nearby gas station, from which a phone call was placed to Bonner's girlfriend several hours after the robbery.

Bonner was convicted at trial. However, the district court granted his motion for a judgment of acquittal after the conviction, having deferred ruling on Bonner's motion made after the close of the Government's case (and every subsequent opportunity). The Government appealed, arguing that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, when considered in the light most favorable to the Government.

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of the motion for acquittal. The court concluded that there was a "conspicuous absence of any contemporaneous 'identity' evidence linking the defendant to the robbery." As for the DNA match to the Yankee cap, the court noted that the cap had several different DNA samples on it and nothing proved that Bonner wore it the night of the robbery (as opposed to some other time). The court also refused to rely on an inference put forth by the Government that the dog tracking a scent from the scene to the gas station did so based on the "predominant DNA" present on the cap (Bonner's). The court noted that the Government's inference lacked any basis in the record. In addition, "not every articulable inference is proper because scientific rigor demands more than a theory of plausible deductions strung together."

Thursday, July 28, 2011

Tailgating traffic stop lasts too long

US v. Digiovanni: The government appealed the district court's decision in this case to suppress evidence found after a traffic stop for tailgating lead to a baseless, involuntary vehicle search on I-95. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to suppress.

In addressing the length of the stop, the district court found that it lasted longer than necessary, at approximately 15 minutes, when the purpose of the stop was to issue Digiovanni with a warning not to tailgate. The police officer did not diligently check Digiovanni's license, instead he embarked on a unwarranted drug investigation, not supported by any reasonable suspicion. The district court also found fault with the officer's coercive attitude during the traffic stop and the involuntariness of the written consent Digiovanni signed.

Neither party disputed the lawful nature of the traffic stop at its inception; however, the seizure was not limited in both scope and duration as required under Terry: if the officer wants to extend the discussion outside the scope of the initial stop, there must be reasonable suspicion or he must receive the driver's consent. Unrelated questions during an investigative stop are okay, but they cannot extend the length of the time in which the defendant is detained.

The articulated facts of the case, according to the district court, simply did not eliminate a substantial portion of innocent travelers, so there was no reasonable suspicion to investigate Digiovanni beyond the traffic stop. The video evidence from the police car helped to expose the absurdity of the stop and its justifications to great effect.

Friday, July 08, 2011

Abuse-of-trust enhancement ok'd for fake bail bondsman

US v. Brack: Brack pled guilty to wire fraud and aggravated identity theft, after posing as a bail bondsman and pretending to assist an elderly man in posting bond for his granddaughter. Brack took the man's social security card, driver's licence and ATM card, opening up multiple lines of credit and purchasing several items; he later gave Brack cash amounting to $16,568 and the deeds to two properties as collateral for his granddaughter's bond. At Brack's sentencing, the district court applied an abuse-of-trust enhancement, based on her masquerade as a licensed bail bondsman. The Fourth Circuit affirmed.

Brack failed to object to the abuse-of-trust enhancement at sentencing, so the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court's factual findings only for clear error. The Fourth Circuit discussed how the enhancement applies to imposters, so long as the "defendant provides sufficient indicia to the victim that the defendant legitimately holds a position of private or public trust." Brack argued that as a matter of law, bail bondsmen in North Carolina do not occupy a position of public or private trust, to which the Fourth Circuit responded that indeed, bail bondsmen are subject to a comprehensive system of regulation to obtain a license, their qualifications are spelled out statutorily, and they must meet residency, educational and training requirements - clearly positions of public trust that entail certain fiduciary duties to customers. The Fourth Circuit concluded that no clear error occurred in the imposition of the abuse-of-trust enhancement in Brack's case.

Just deserts for timely acceptance of responsibility

United States v. Divens: Divens pled guilty to distributing cocaine, signed his acceptance of responsibility letter, but declined to sign a plea agreement that would waive his right to appellate review and collateral attack. The Government subsequently refused to give Divens a third-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under sect. 3E1.1(b).

At the time of sentencing, Divens objected to the pre-sentence report Guidelines calculation, acknowledging that the district court could only award the third level reduction upon motion of the Government, and the Government argued that its refusal to move for the additional reduction was "rationally related to the purposes of the guidelines" because it allowed the Government to avoid defense of "a complete appeal" and to "allocate its resources to other matters."

The Fourth Circuit broke with other circuits in determining that the Government does not enjoy the discretion it does under sect. 5K1.1 in sect. 3E1.1, finding that sect. 3E1.1 does not require that a defendant provide the prosecution with assistance that must reduce "expense and uncertainty" at attends an appeal. Nothing in sect. 3E1.1 permits the Government to withold the third level reduction on the basis of an interest in conserving appellate resources. Next, the Fourth Circuit disagreed with the Government that courts should interpret the guidelines in a manner that facilitates the Government's pursuit of appellate waivers. Third, the Fourth Circuit held that when a defendant pleads guilty unconditionally in a timely fashion, that defendant's refusal to sign an appellate waiver has no impact on the ability to challenge a conviction or on the Government's need to "anticipate" such a challenge.

Congrats to Jonathan Byrne in the Southern District of West Virginia!!!

Monday, May 30, 2011

Nearly 20-year sentence vacated by 4th Circuit

US v. Doyle: Doyle was convicted of receiving, possessing and mailing child pornography, and received a sentence of 235 months. On appeal, Doyle challenged the district court's decision to deny his motion to suppress. The Fourth Circuit disagreed with the district court that the good faith exception from Leon applied in this case, and held that the affidavit in support of the search warrant lacked the necessary information that the neutral magistrate could glean probable cause to support a search for child porn. The Fourth Circuit framed the question for review as not whether the warrant was simply deficient, rather whether the warrant was so deficient that relying upon it was unreasonable, thus precluding the operation of the good faith exception.

Wednesday, May 18, 2011

Court appointed counsel and their clients are people, too

US v. Smith, a.k.a. Poe: It's a subject matter close to the hearts of court appointed counsel everywhere, the quality of harmony in attorney-client relations. In this appeal, defendant Smith challenged the voluntariness of his plea, to which he had agreed following several attempts to obtain substitute counsel.

The Fourth Circuit waxes sympathetic as it considers the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel, to deal with Smith's contention that the district court's denial of his substitution of counsel request rendered his guilty plea involuntary (he had been named in a 20-count indictment charging him and 27 others with racketeering and conspiracy to district and possess with intent to distribute drugs). "The mere physical presence of counsel is not enough: it is the marriage of the attorney's legal knowledge and mature judgment with the defendant's factual knowledge that makes for an adequate defense...more than a 'warm body' is required to satisfy the Sixth Amendment." The Fourth Circuit refers to Sixth Circuit's findings in three cases of per se Sixth Amendment violations, and a Ninth Circuit case where the denial of a substitution motion resulted in the constructive denial of counsel. Upon resolving the question of the appropriate standard of review to consider the denial of substitution requests as clear error review, the Fourth Circuit declines to find clear error.

Was Smith's guilty plea rendered involuntary? Was it effectively uncounseled because of a failure to communicate between appointed counsel and client? The parties remained on speaking terms, counsel continued to make visits to his client in prison, and though the two may have argued, the Fourth Circuit found that there was no conclusive break prior to the plea hearing, and Smith's contention that his plea was involuntary failed. Neither did the Fourth Circuit find that the denial of Smith's request for substitute counsel at the time of sentencing cause a clear error.

The Fourth Circuit considered the nature of the communication between counsel and client throughout the representation, and it noted that there had been severe damage by the time of sentencing; yet, since counsel and client had met, reviewed the PSR, and communicated enough to allow counsel to present some concerns to the court, the Fourth Circuit declined to find that counsel failed to render genuinely effective assistance.

And while "there is no one-free-lawyer" rule, the Fourth Circuit found that Smith's one appointed lawyer was sufficient here to protect his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.

Tuesday, May 17, 2011

Confrontation Clause at sentencing hearings

US v. Powell: Powell was convicted of mail fraud, wire fraud and attempted destruction of evidence, following an investigation made on behalf of customers of his Internet-based electronics sales business. On appeal, Powell challenged the way the government gathered evidence against him for use at his sentencing hearing: the number of victims and amounts of monetary losses were not solely determined by trial testimony, but also through hearsay statements of other victims made to the investigating postal inspector. The government requested an enhanced sentence based on all of this evidence, not just the testimony of the eight victims who testified at trial. Powell argued that these investigatory methods violated his Confrontation Clause rights by relying on hearsay statements from individuals who did not testify.

The Fourth Circuit discussed the distinctions between trial evidence and sentencing evidence, especially with respect to hearsay, finding a long line of established cases in the Supreme Court, sister circuits and its own jurisprudence, indicating the confrontation right does not apply at sentencing. The Fourth Circuit found that Powell was not without some evidentiary protections, however, stating that due process requires a minimal level of reliability sufficient to support its "probable accuracy" as required by the Guidelines.

Friday, May 13, 2011

"Structural" versus "trial error" in discussion of co-defendants' guilty pleas

US v. Poole: Poole, an accountant, was convicted following a bench trial of four counts of aiding and assisting in the preparation of false tax returns. The Fourth Circuit affirmed.

Poole's appeal challenged the district court's verdict in three ways, claiming that the convictions were unlawfully based on the guilty pleas of his co-defendants, on the improperly credited testimony by a key government witness that Poole believed to have been false, and insufficient evidence that he knew the returns were fraudulent and that he acted willfully in filing them.

Poole referred to the district court's multiple mentions of his co-defendants' guilty plea on the record as grounds for denying him a fair trial. The Fourth Circuit found these statements to constitute error on the basis that the district court gave consideration to facts not in evidence. While Poole wanted the Fourth Circuit to find this error as "structural" as opposed to "trial error," as explained in United States v. Blevins, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court's error was "a classic example of trial error subject to harmless error review," and following a harmless error analysis, found the error harmless in light of "overwhelming" evidence of Poole's guilt.

The Fourth Circuit considered Poole's second appeal issue as a request to reverse a credibility determination, made by the district court, which it declined to do; it deferred to the district court's estimation of the witness's credibility and reliability. Finally, the Fourth Circuit determined that Poole purposefully ignored large accounting discrepancies, such that he could not claim willfull blindness about his clients' financial misdeeds.

Thursday, May 12, 2011

Overreaching protective sweep "saved" by independent source doctrine

US v. Bullard: Bullard was convicted of possession with intent to deliver crack. He appealed the denial of a motion to suppress, argued the disparities in sentencing for cocaine and crack offenses violate both Equal Protection and Due Process, and that the FSA should apply to him.

First, the Fourth Circuit held that Bullard's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by the investigating officers in this case. After finding it unnecessary to determine whether Bullard had a privacy interest as an unregistered hotel guest, the Court focused its attention on the problematic protective sweep the police conducted here. The protective sweep included a search of closed luggage and cabinets, but only after the police had found obviously incriminating evidence in plain view (e.g. the "smell" of narcotics, paraphernalia, and cocaine residue); however, the Fourth Circuit found that the sweep was saved by the independent source doctrine for two reasons: 1) the officers did not rely on the information they obtained in the protective sweep to obtain their search warrant; and 2) the officers intended at the outset of the search to obtain a search warrant. An overly aggressive protective sweep requires suppression, only if the "illegal search tainted the later recovery of the same evidence pursuant to a valid search warrant."

Second, the Fourth Circuit held that only the Supreme Court could overrule Fourth Circuit precedent set by a prior Fourth Circuit panel, declining to adjust the position that the disparities in crack and cocaine sentencing in 21 U.S.C. sect. 841 do not violate Equal Protection or Due Process rights.

Third, the Fourth Circuit held that the Savings Statute precludes the retroactive application of the new penalty provisions of the FSA to individuals who had been sentenced prior to the effective date of the FSA in early August 2010, a decision in concert with sister circuit rulings.

Murder and Conspiracy convictions affirmed following evidentiary challenges

US v. Byers: Byers and Co-Defendant Goodman were convicted of conspiracy and murder of a witness, Carl Lackl, to prevent Lackl from testifying in a Maryland state murder trial. On appeal, the two challenged several evidentiary rulings, and Goodman appealed the denial of his pretrial motion to suppress. The Fourth Circuit affirmed.

Lackl was to testify as an eyewitness against Byers in the March 2006 shooting of Larry Haynes; another eyewitness recanted, leaving Lackl as the sole person who could place Byers at the Haynes murder scene. Whether Byers had motive to kill and whether Lackl was accurate in his identification of Byers in the earlier murder investigation became crucial at trial.

The Fourth Circuit determined that 404(b) evidence of Byers's invovled in two prior shootings suggested a common theme, and was "necessary" to counter Byers's strategy of negating motive. And, for good measure, even if the district court abused its discretion in allowing this evidence in, the Fourth Circuit found this error was harmless. Byers attacked Lackl's reliability as an effective witness and Lackl's identification of Byers at the scene of Haynes's murder. Also, the Fourth Circuit held that it was not error to admit the statements of Lackl's girlfriend, who warned him of the mortal danger of his involvement as a testimonial witness.

Goodman's appeal issues concerned the testimony of a rebuttal witness, arguing that the proposed testimony failed to counter any new evidence presented in Goodman's case-in-chief. The Fourth Circuit decided that the proposed testimony went to the witness's credibility, and any error in admitting it was harmless. Goodman also appealed the denial of his motion to suppress of his post-arrest statements, which he claimed were involuntary. Under a totality of the circumstances, the Fourth Circuit found no unconstitutional coercion on the record.

Rehearing on Batson claim results in affirmance

US v. Barnette: Barnette was convicted in 2000 of killing his ex-girlfriend and another person. He received a death sentence, appealed it, had his convictions affirmed but received a new sentencing hearing. His death sentence was affirmed; on his second appeal of the sentencing, the Fourth Circuit rejected his initial Batson challenge. Barnette appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari, vacated the judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration of the Batson claim in light of the Supreme Court's recently-issued opinion, Miller-El v. Dretke. The Fourth Circuit remanded to the district court, which in turn issued a memorandum order, finding that Barnette had not met his burden of demonstrating that the prosecution had engaged in unconstitutional peremptory strikes against five African American members of the jury venire for his second sentencing in 2002. The Fourth Circuit found no prejudicial error in the district court's findings, and affirmed.

Monday, May 09, 2011

Burglary of "Shop" In Virginia Triggers ACCA Enhancement

US v. Baxter: Baxter was convicted of being a felon in possession and was sentenced as an armed career criminal. Baxter argued that a 1976 Virginia conviction for burglarizing a "shop" was not a violent felony, within the meaning of ACCA. The district court disagreed. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the sentence. Relying on "the definitive construction" of the burglary statute from the Virginia Supreme Court, the court held that "shop" was not so vague as Baxter argued and that the "shop" was "affixed to the ground" and therefore fell within the generic definition of "burglary" found in Taylor v. US, 495 U.S. 575 (1990).

Delay In Mutli-Defendant Drug Case Doesn't Violate STA or Due Process

US v. Shealey: Shealey was initially charged, along with several codefendants, with several counts related to the distribution of drugs. As trial neared - already delayed by on continuance - one of Shealey's codefendants sought further delay, based on a change of counsel and the late delivery of substantial discovery by the Government. Shealey objected to the continuance and asked for his trial to be severed from the others and to proceed without delay. That motion was denied. After rejecting a plea bargain, Shealey was further charged with two counts of money laundering. He was convicted on all counts at trial and sentenced to life in prison.

On appeal, Shealey raised several arguments challenging his conviction and sentence, all of which the Fourth Circuit rejected. First, Shealey argued that the district court erred by dismissing his motion to sever, particularly given that numerous codefendants who testified at his trial only pleaded guilty after the original trial date had passed. The court disagreed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion and that Shealey's argument for why he was harmed is not an injury to a "specific trial right" or other prejudice that resulted from a joint trial. Second, Shealey argued that the late filing of the superseding indictment against him violated his right to due process because it gave the Government time to negotiate plea bargains with other defendants/witnesses. The court disagreed, holding that Shealey could not point to any concrete prejudice he suffered as a result. Finally, Shealey argued that his life sentence was substantively unreasonable. The court disagreed, noting his criminal history and "voluminous quantities of drugs" involved.

Felony Enhancements for Unauthorized Computer Access Misdemeanors Violate Double Jeopardy

US v. Cioni: Cioni engaged in a pattern of harassment against an ex-lover and those around him. As a result, she was charged with several offenses, including two counts of obtaining information through unauthorized access to computers. Although that offense is ordinarily a misdemeanor, it can become a felony if it was committed "in furtherance" of other offenses. In Cioni's case, she was alleged to have committed the offenses in furtherance of obtaining access to communications in electronic storage. The jury convicted her on those charges (and three others) and found they were committed in furtherance of other offenses, triggering the felony enhancement.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed Cioni's convictions on those two counts, remanded for the imposition of misdemeanor convictions and for resentencing. The court agreed with Cioni that, the way the offenses were charged, she was convicted of the misdemeanor offense and then had that enhanced to a felony, based on the same conduct. That enhancement violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. The court then rejected Cioni's arguments that the evidence was insufficient to sustain two of the other convictions against her, that she did not knowingly and voluntarily waive her right to counsel at sentencing, where she proceeded pro se, and several other minor arguments. The court vacated Cioni's 15-month sentence, the two felony convictions, and remanded for further proceedings.