US v. Benkahla: This case is a third one dealing with terrorism related charges arising out of an Islamic center in Falls Church, Virginia (see the prior Chandia and Khan decisions for more detail). Benkahla was initially charged and acquitted in a bench trial of supplying services to the Taliban and using a firearm in connection therewith in 2004, after being arrested in Saudi Arabia in 2003 (related to the recent Abu Ali decision). The basis for the court's acquittal was the Government failed to prove that the training camp Benkahla attended was in Afghanistan. Undaunted, the Government convened a grand jury to investigate charges of providing material support to terrorist organizations and subpoenaed Benkahla to testify multiple times, during which he denied any involvement. in 2006, the Government indicted Benkahla for making false statements to the grand jury, obstruction of justice, and making false statements to the FBI. After a jury convicted on those charges, the district court at sentencing applying the terrorism Guideline, but eventually imposing a variance sentence of 121 months in prison.
On appeal, Benkahla raised several issues, all of which the Fourth Circuit rejected. First, he argued that the Government was collaterally estopped from prosecuting him for false statements after his acquittal on related charges. While recognizing the "tension" inherent in such situations, the Court ultimately found it not to be problematic, focusing on the district court's narrow ground for acquittal in the first trial. Second, he argued that evidence presented at his trial on the nature of radical Islam, jihad, and terrorism was unduly prejudicial. The court concluded otherwise, noting its relevance to the elements of the offenses with which he was charged and noting that the jury acquitted Benkahla on some charges, thus showing it was not unduly swayed by prejudice. Finally, the court rejected Benkahla's argument about the proper application of the terrorism Guideline, specifically rejecting a Sixth Amendment-based Booker argument, noting that "the point is thus that the Guidelines must be advisory, not that judges may find no facts."
Case summaries and analysis from Federal Defender Offices located in the Fourth Circuit (WV, VA, MD, NC, SC)
Tuesday, July 01, 2008
Tuesday, June 17, 2008
Omissions from Warrant and Date Error Don't Require Suppression
US v. Gary: Gary was convicted (of what the opinion doesn't say) based at least partly on information developed during a search of a home in Richmond, based on an anonymous tip. The tipster alleged that "Melvin" was selling heroin out of the home. A police officer investigated, rummaging through the trash in the alley behind the home, discovering items with heroin residue, packaging materials, and discarded mail indicating that the trash came from the target address. He applied for a search warrant, in which he failed to disclose that there were multiple trash cans in the alley, only one of which was marked as belonging to the target address, and indicated that the investigation took place a year before it actually did. The district court denied Gary's motion to suppress the evidence.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed, unanimously, in an opinion written by ex-Justice O'Connor. The court rejected Gary's argument that under Franks the information left out of the warrant application required suppression. The court concluded that the information left out of the warrant would not have changed whether probable cause was present. The court also rejected Gary's argument that, notwithstanding the omissions, the warrant application was not sufficient to justify a search because of the discrepancy in dates between the actual investigation and what was written on the application. Noting that the discrepancy wasn't even mentioned until the district court noticed it at the suppression hearing, it was clearly a typo and not destructive to probable cause. Even if it was, the Leon good-faith shield saved the search.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed, unanimously, in an opinion written by ex-Justice O'Connor. The court rejected Gary's argument that under Franks the information left out of the warrant application required suppression. The court concluded that the information left out of the warrant would not have changed whether probable cause was present. The court also rejected Gary's argument that, notwithstanding the omissions, the warrant application was not sufficient to justify a search because of the discrepancy in dates between the actual investigation and what was written on the application. Noting that the discrepancy wasn't even mentioned until the district court noticed it at the suppression hearing, it was clearly a typo and not destructive to probable cause. Even if it was, the Leon good-faith shield saved the search.
Thursday, June 12, 2008
Big Terrorism Case Leads to Split on Sentencing Review
US v. Abu Ali: Ali is a US citizen, born in Virginia, who eventually travelled to Saudi Arabia, where he became involved with an Al-Qaeda cell. After a bombing in Riyadh (in which Ali was not involved), Saudi authorities cracked down. Investigation of Ali and others led to indictment in the US against Ali for various terrorism and related charges, in addition to conspiracy to assassinate the President. He was convicted by a jury of all charges. In a lengthy opinion, the Fourth Circuit unanimously affirms the conviction, rejecting numerous challenges that are most likely to occur only in similar transnational terrorism cases.
The real action, from the more mundane perspective, involves sentencing. Ali's Guideline range called for a mandatory life sentence. At sentencing, the district court varied down to 360 months, based on both the particular facts of Ali's offense and background (he never actually perpetrated any violent acts, no violence in his past, etc.) as well as comparison with what the district court thought were two similar cases - those of John Walker Lindh and Tim McVeigh/Terry Nichols. Noting that Lindh only got 20 years and Nichols got life where his offense involved actual killing, the district court concluded that a variance to 360 months was necessary.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit vacated the sentence, 2-1. The majority heavily dissected the district court's comparison between Ali's case and Lindh/Nichols and concluded that it gave too much weight to those comparisons, which were flawed to begin with. The majority did not state categorically that a 360-month sentence would always be unreasonable, but vacated and remanded for further proceedings. Judge Motz dissented on the sentencing issue, arguing that the majority's review ignored Gall and failed to provide the proper level of deference to the district court's sentence, concluding that it was a reasonable sentence, if not ,perhaps, the most reasonable.
The real action, from the more mundane perspective, involves sentencing. Ali's Guideline range called for a mandatory life sentence. At sentencing, the district court varied down to 360 months, based on both the particular facts of Ali's offense and background (he never actually perpetrated any violent acts, no violence in his past, etc.) as well as comparison with what the district court thought were two similar cases - those of John Walker Lindh and Tim McVeigh/Terry Nichols. Noting that Lindh only got 20 years and Nichols got life where his offense involved actual killing, the district court concluded that a variance to 360 months was necessary.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit vacated the sentence, 2-1. The majority heavily dissected the district court's comparison between Ali's case and Lindh/Nichols and concluded that it gave too much weight to those comparisons, which were flawed to begin with. The majority did not state categorically that a 360-month sentence would always be unreasonable, but vacated and remanded for further proceedings. Judge Motz dissented on the sentencing issue, arguing that the majority's review ignored Gall and failed to provide the proper level of deference to the district court's sentence, concluding that it was a reasonable sentence, if not ,perhaps, the most reasonable.
Monday, June 02, 2008
Court Upholds 316% Upward Variance
US v. Evans: Evans committed a series of fraud and identity theft offenses, starting when he bought some personal information of Wachovia Bank account holders from a friend who worked at the bank. Eventually, he passed $13,600 in bad checks on the accounts of two individuals. Based on that loss, Evans's advisory Guideline range at sentencing was 24-30 months. In addition, the Government moved for a downward departure for Evans's substantial assistance in going after the friend who sold him the information. The district court saw things quite differently, concluding that the Guidelines grossly understated Evans's criminal history and the seriousness of his offense. It imposed a sentence of 125 months in prison.
On appeal, Evans argued that his sentence was unreasonable. After holding the case in abeyance pending the outcome of Gall, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the sentence. The court reviewed the record and concluded that the district court "carefully and thoroughly applied the prescribed sentencing factors" when imposing sentence. Affirmance was necessary, given "the requisite deference we must accord to the considered judgment of the district court." The court then specifically rejected Evans's argument that the Guidelines prohibited a departure on the grounds relied upon by the district court (the district court cited some Guideline provisions during the sentencing), concluding that if the sentence is reasonable and the district court was applying the 3553(a) factors the Guideline analysis was irrelevant. The court also rejected Evans's argument that the scope of the variance was too great. Judge Gregory concurred in the judgment, but wrote separately to "encourage a more tempered overall approach to the substantive reasonableness analysis."
On appeal, Evans argued that his sentence was unreasonable. After holding the case in abeyance pending the outcome of Gall, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the sentence. The court reviewed the record and concluded that the district court "carefully and thoroughly applied the prescribed sentencing factors" when imposing sentence. Affirmance was necessary, given "the requisite deference we must accord to the considered judgment of the district court." The court then specifically rejected Evans's argument that the Guidelines prohibited a departure on the grounds relied upon by the district court (the district court cited some Guideline provisions during the sentencing), concluding that if the sentence is reasonable and the district court was applying the 3553(a) factors the Guideline analysis was irrelevant. The court also rejected Evans's argument that the scope of the variance was too great. Judge Gregory concurred in the judgment, but wrote separately to "encourage a more tempered overall approach to the substantive reasonableness analysis."
Tuesday, May 20, 2008
Court Affirms Kidnapping/Murder Conviction
US v. Lentz: Lentz was charged with kidnapping resulting in death stemming from the disappearance of his wife. The Govt theorized that Lentz lured his wife from her home in Virginia to his home in Maryland, where he then killed her.After trial, the district court granted Lentz's motion for a judgment of acquittal on the ground that the Govt failed to prove that Lentz "held" his wife for any period of time before killing her. The district court also granted Lentz's motion for a new trial due to two of the victim's dayplanners that had not been admitted into evidence popping up in the jury room. The district court went so far as to find that an AUSA had intentionally slipped the dayplanners, which contained notes from the victim detailing her abusive relationship with her husband, into the jury room to taint the jury. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the new trial motion and remanded for a new trial.
At a second trial, Lentz was again convicted, partly due to evidence of a murder for hire plot he hatched from jail against witnesses from the first trial and some of the AUSAs. Unfortunately, Lentz discussed the plot with a cellmate who turned informant. Even more unfortunately, Lentz discussed the plot with his attorney in phone calls from the jail that were recorded. Lentz moved to exclude evidence from both sources, with only partial success. While some of the informant's testimony was excluded because it came after a meeting with investigators that essentially turned him into a Government agent, testimony about earlier conversations with Lentz and the attorney phone calls were admitted.
Lentz raised several unsuccessful issues on appeal. First, he argued that the district court constructively amended the indictment by instructing the jury that, for purposes of the kidnapping statute, the District of Columbia was a "state." The Fourth Circuit rejected the argument that the district court's instruction amended the indictment, which alleged travel from Virginia to Maryland, holding that the indictment never required proof of travel directly from Virginia to Maryland, only that they be the starting and ending points. Second, Lentz argued that the district court erred by allowing any evidence of the murder-for-hire plot into evidence. As to the informant's testimony, the Fourth held that the statements from Lentz made prior to the informant becoming a de facto Government agent were not acquired in violation of the Sixth Amendment. As to the phone calls with his lawyer, the Fourth held that the calls fell clearly into the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. The Fourth also rejected Lentz's argument that the statements were unduly prejudicial and that, in their redacted form as presented at trial, they violated the rule of completeness found in FRE 106. Third, the Fourth rejected Lentz's argument that hearsay statements made by his wife about the OJ Simpson case (i.e., that Lentz told her "if OJ can do it and get away with it, so can I") were admissible under the "forfeiture by wrongdoing" exception in FRE 804.
At a second trial, Lentz was again convicted, partly due to evidence of a murder for hire plot he hatched from jail against witnesses from the first trial and some of the AUSAs. Unfortunately, Lentz discussed the plot with a cellmate who turned informant. Even more unfortunately, Lentz discussed the plot with his attorney in phone calls from the jail that were recorded. Lentz moved to exclude evidence from both sources, with only partial success. While some of the informant's testimony was excluded because it came after a meeting with investigators that essentially turned him into a Government agent, testimony about earlier conversations with Lentz and the attorney phone calls were admitted.
Lentz raised several unsuccessful issues on appeal. First, he argued that the district court constructively amended the indictment by instructing the jury that, for purposes of the kidnapping statute, the District of Columbia was a "state." The Fourth Circuit rejected the argument that the district court's instruction amended the indictment, which alleged travel from Virginia to Maryland, holding that the indictment never required proof of travel directly from Virginia to Maryland, only that they be the starting and ending points. Second, Lentz argued that the district court erred by allowing any evidence of the murder-for-hire plot into evidence. As to the informant's testimony, the Fourth held that the statements from Lentz made prior to the informant becoming a de facto Government agent were not acquired in violation of the Sixth Amendment. As to the phone calls with his lawyer, the Fourth held that the calls fell clearly into the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. The Fourth also rejected Lentz's argument that the statements were unduly prejudicial and that, in their redacted form as presented at trial, they violated the rule of completeness found in FRE 106. Third, the Fourth rejected Lentz's argument that hearsay statements made by his wife about the OJ Simpson case (i.e., that Lentz told her "if OJ can do it and get away with it, so can I") were admissible under the "forfeiture by wrongdoing" exception in FRE 804.
Court Upholds Terry Patdown in High-Crime Area
US v. Black: Black was walking home in a "high crime" area of Richmond when he passed a marked police car. An officer in the car engaged Black in conversation and became suspicious that Black might have a weapon in his pocket. When asked, Black took his left hand out of his coat pocket, but only after being asked twice. At that point, the officer saw a bulge that he suspected was a firearm. Asked what he had in his pocked, Black said it was just money and an ID. Black then put his hand back in his pocket. At that point, the officer said, "take your hand out of your pocket, I don't want to have to shoot you." Another officer then patted down Black and identified the bulge as a firearm. After being hand cuffed, Black admitted that he did not have a permit to carry the weapon and was a convicted felon.
Black was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. He moved to suppress the gun, arguing that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to seize and pat him down. The district court denied the motion. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed. On appeal (at least), everyone agreed that the encounter between Black and the officers was consensual and did not implicate the Fourth Amendment until the officer said. "I don't want to have to shoot you." Based on the totality of circumstances up to that point, the Fourth Circuit held that there was reasonable suspicion to believe Black possessed a weapon.
Judge Gregory dissented, writing that he "cannot accept that Fourth Amendment protections are suspended or reduced in so-called 'high-crime' neighborhoods.'" For Judge Gregory, the seizure took place when Black was first asked to remove his hand from his pocket.
Black was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. He moved to suppress the gun, arguing that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to seize and pat him down. The district court denied the motion. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed. On appeal (at least), everyone agreed that the encounter between Black and the officers was consensual and did not implicate the Fourth Amendment until the officer said. "I don't want to have to shoot you." Based on the totality of circumstances up to that point, the Fourth Circuit held that there was reasonable suspicion to believe Black possessed a weapon.
Judge Gregory dissented, writing that he "cannot accept that Fourth Amendment protections are suspended or reduced in so-called 'high-crime' neighborhoods.'" For Judge Gregory, the seizure took place when Black was first asked to remove his hand from his pocket.
Court Upholds Defendant-Initiated Post-IA Questioning Without Counsel
US v. Cain: Cain was arrested as part of a DEA sting. After his arrest, he told the DEA agents that he wanted to cooperate with them. The next day, Cain made an initial appearance, at which time he was determined to be eligible for court appointed counsel, although no specific attorney was appointed at that time. After the initial appearance, Cain again told the agents that he wanted to cooperate. They were unable to talk with Cain at that time.
The next day, Cain was returned to the courthouse for a meeting with the DEA agents and an AUSA. By this point, the CJA panel had been informed of its appointment to represent Cain, but it's not clear when a specific attorney was appointed. The interview went ahead, after Cain had been advised of his Miranda rights. Based in part of what was said during that interview, Cain was charged with multiple drug distribution counts. Cain filed a motion to suppress his interview statements, arguing that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated because the agents/AUSA did not attempt to contact his CJA attorney. The district court granted the motion.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed. Noting that Cain's Sixth Amendment rights had attached, the court nonetheless held that the record showed Cain's repeated attempts to initiate contact with the DEA agents. Furthermore, Cain was advise of his Miranda rights three separate times, including right before the interview. In such circumstances, his Sixth Amendment rights were not violated. The Fourth also rejected the district court's alternate holding that the statements should be excluded under the court's supervisory power because the Government violated the court's CJA plan.
The next day, Cain was returned to the courthouse for a meeting with the DEA agents and an AUSA. By this point, the CJA panel had been informed of its appointment to represent Cain, but it's not clear when a specific attorney was appointed. The interview went ahead, after Cain had been advised of his Miranda rights. Based in part of what was said during that interview, Cain was charged with multiple drug distribution counts. Cain filed a motion to suppress his interview statements, arguing that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated because the agents/AUSA did not attempt to contact his CJA attorney. The district court granted the motion.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed. Noting that Cain's Sixth Amendment rights had attached, the court nonetheless held that the record showed Cain's repeated attempts to initiate contact with the DEA agents. Furthermore, Cain was advise of his Miranda rights three separate times, including right before the interview. In such circumstances, his Sixth Amendment rights were not violated. The Fourth also rejected the district court's alternate holding that the statements should be excluded under the court's supervisory power because the Government violated the court's CJA plan.
Inidividual Liability Still Jury Found After Booker
US v. Brooks: Brooks and several codefendants, including Mathis, were charged with several drug counts, including conspiracy to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine and 50 grams of crack. On appeal, Mathis and another codefendant argued that their convictions violated US v. Collins, 415 F.3d 304 (4th Cir. 2005), which required the jury to determine the amount of drugs attributable to each member of a conspiracy before a mandatory minimum could be triggered.
Proceeding only on Mathis's claim (because the other codefendant admitted at oral argument that he was responsible for more than 50 grams of crack), the Fourth Circuit concluded that Collins had been violated and returned Mathis's case to the district court. Of particular importance, the court rejected the Government's argument that Booker effectively overruled Collins, noting that Collins dealt with mandatory statutory sentencing ranges, not advisory Guideline ranges. The court then quickly rejected challenges by other codefendants to their convictions and sentences. Judge Niemeyer dissented from the Collins holding, arguing that the majority's position was incompatible with that case as well as Booker.
Proceeding only on Mathis's claim (because the other codefendant admitted at oral argument that he was responsible for more than 50 grams of crack), the Fourth Circuit concluded that Collins had been violated and returned Mathis's case to the district court. Of particular importance, the court rejected the Government's argument that Booker effectively overruled Collins, noting that Collins dealt with mandatory statutory sentencing ranges, not advisory Guideline ranges. The court then quickly rejected challenges by other codefendants to their convictions and sentences. Judge Niemeyer dissented from the Collins holding, arguing that the majority's position was incompatible with that case as well as Booker.
Tuesday, May 13, 2008
Retail Value of Bootlegs Based on Value of Legit Copies
US v. Armstead: Armstead was charged with and convicted of distribution of bootlegged DVDs (100 on one occasion, 200 on another) with "a total retail value of more than $2500." The only issue below and in the Fourth Circuit was how to make a proper measure of "retail value." Armstead argued that it should be the value of bootleg DVDs on the black market, which would be the price paid in the transactions, $500 and $1000, respectively. The Government argued that it should be the value of legitimate copies of what is on the DVDs, which would make each transaction worth well over the $2500 threshold.
The district court and the Fourth Circuit agreed with the Government, holding that "retail value" comes from taking the highest of the "face value," "par value," or "market value" in the retail context. Applying that definition, the evidence was sufficient to sustain Armstead's conviction.
The district court and the Fourth Circuit agreed with the Government, holding that "retail value" comes from taking the highest of the "face value," "par value," or "market value" in the retail context. Applying that definition, the evidence was sufficient to sustain Armstead's conviction.
Defendant Entitled to Franks Hearing Due to Omitted Facts
US v. Tate: Tate was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. The gun came to light during a search of Tate's home based on a warrant obtained by a Baltimore police officer. As basis for obtaining the warrant, the officer told the state judge that he had searched through two of Tate's trash bags that were "easily accessible from the rear yard of" Tate's home and discovered marijuana residue. Prior to trial, Tate sought a Franks hearing, arguing that the officer omitted a material fact from the warrant application - that the trash bags were only "easily accessible" because the officer hopped fence (with a locked gate) and took the bags off the home's back porch. The bags had not been placed in the nearby alley, as they would be on trash pick up day. The district court denied Tate's request for a Franks hearing, holding that the officer's application was "literally true."
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed and held that Tate was entitled to a Franks hearing. The court held that Tate "clearly described the nature of [the officer's] omissions; he gave reasons for why he considered the omissions deliberately deceptive and material; and he proffered evidence in support of his position . . .." The court noted that the Government's argument, which "essentially parrot[ed]" the district court's, that the statement in the application was literally true fails to deal with the nature of the omitted facts. Finally, the court held that if Tate's factual assertions are true the officer illegally searched Tate's garbage and therefore lacked probable cause to obtain the warrant.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed and held that Tate was entitled to a Franks hearing. The court held that Tate "clearly described the nature of [the officer's] omissions; he gave reasons for why he considered the omissions deliberately deceptive and material; and he proffered evidence in support of his position . . .." The court noted that the Government's argument, which "essentially parrot[ed]" the district court's, that the statement in the application was literally true fails to deal with the nature of the omitted facts. Finally, the court held that if Tate's factual assertions are true the officer illegally searched Tate's garbage and therefore lacked probable cause to obtain the warrant.
Right to Counsel on Underlying Charges Not Violated by Witness Tampering Investigation
US v. Mir: Mir was an immigration lawyer who assisted employers in completing the necessary paperwork to sponsor aliens for work in the United States and to allow alien workers to become permanent US residents. The Government began an investigation of Mir and his law firm on suspicion that some of the forms he completed contained false information. During the investigation, Mir sent a letter to the Government stating that he was represented by counsel. Eventually, a grand jury indicted Mir and his law firm for conspiracy to commit labor certification fraud, fraud, and racketeering. After the indictment, investigators suspected that Mir was tampering with witnesses. The Government used two aliens as CIs, sending them to Mir's office to record conversations with him. Based on those recordings, a witness tampering charge was added to the indictment. Mir unsuccessfully moved to suppress those recordings as a violation of his right to counsel or, alternately, sever the witness tampering charge from the rest of the indictment. Mir was convicted of fraud, but acquitted of conspiracy and witness tampering.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Mir raised his Sixth Amendment argument, which was rejected by the court. The Fourth Circuit held that Mir's invocation of his right to counsel on the conspiracy and fraud charges did not apply to the separate offense of witness tampering. Although the two sets of offenses have "a point of factual overlap," they are still separate offenses. In addition, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in not severing the witness tampering charge from the others, noting that it "would have made little sense."
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Mir raised his Sixth Amendment argument, which was rejected by the court. The Fourth Circuit held that Mir's invocation of his right to counsel on the conspiracy and fraud charges did not apply to the separate offense of witness tampering. Although the two sets of offenses have "a point of factual overlap," they are still separate offenses. In addition, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in not severing the witness tampering charge from the others, noting that it "would have made little sense."
Friday, May 02, 2008
Magistrate Judges May Accept Guilty Pleas
US v. Benton: Benton was charged with conspiracy to distribute drugs. He reached a plea agreement with the Government, which included a provision allowing a magistrate judge to perform the Rule 11 plea hearing. That hearing took place and the magistrate judge accepted Benton's plea. Months later, Benton complained that his attorney had been ineffective by failing to adequately explain the elements of the offense to him. As a result, new counsel was appointed. After new counsel was appointed, Benton filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea alleging that there was an inadequate factual basis, the terms were unconscionable, the Government had breached by failing to file a motion for substantial assistance, and ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the motion. Benton reiterated his motion at sentencing, but it was again denied. He was sentenced to 262 months in prison.
On appeal, Benton made three arguments, all of which the Fourth Circuit rejected. First, he argued that he had the right to withdraw his plea for "any reason or no reason" because the magistrate judge lacked the authority to accept the plea. Because Benton did not make the argument to the district court, the Fourth reviewed it for plain error. The Fourth found there not to be error at all, concluding that magistrate judges can accept guilty pleas, so long as the district court can review that acceptance de novo. The court noted that a "fair and just reason" for withdrawing a plea (as required once it has been accepted) would be a defective plea proceeding before a magistrate judge. Second, he argued that his plea was not knowing and voluntary because the magistrate judge failed to adequately explain the elements of the offense and incorrectly stated the maximum term of supervised release he faced. Finally, Benton renewed his argument that his original counsel was ineffective.
On appeal, Benton made three arguments, all of which the Fourth Circuit rejected. First, he argued that he had the right to withdraw his plea for "any reason or no reason" because the magistrate judge lacked the authority to accept the plea. Because Benton did not make the argument to the district court, the Fourth reviewed it for plain error. The Fourth found there not to be error at all, concluding that magistrate judges can accept guilty pleas, so long as the district court can review that acceptance de novo. The court noted that a "fair and just reason" for withdrawing a plea (as required once it has been accepted) would be a defective plea proceeding before a magistrate judge. Second, he argued that his plea was not knowing and voluntary because the magistrate judge failed to adequately explain the elements of the offense and incorrectly stated the maximum term of supervised release he faced. Finally, Benton renewed his argument that his original counsel was ineffective.
Court Affirms Second-Chance Variance
US v. Curry: Curry sold gold coins on eBay. Problem was, he "sold" coins which he never had in his possession. When the deals began to fall apart and jilted buyers complained, the FBI came calling. Curry was charged and convicted by a jury of multiple counts of mail fraud, wire fraud, and unlawful monetary transactions. At sentencing, Curry's Guideline range came out to be 41 to 51 months. However, the district court imposed a sentence of 12 months on each count (served concurrently), along with 12 months of home confinement, following Curry's argument for a Booker variance. The Government appealed the sentence and the Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded for resentencing.
On remand (pre-Gall), the district court varied again, but only down to 36 months. In doing so, it indicated that any greater variance would only result in another reversal from the Fourth. At a post-sentencing bond hearing, the court said if it were not "laboring under the Fourth Circuit's constraints I would have done something considerably different." Not surprisingly, Curry appealed. Equally unsurprisingly, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the sentence. Noting that it could only pass judgment on the sentence actually given ("That the district court judge expressed frustration with the law does not make the law any less binding"), the court concluded that the 36-month sentence imposed by the district court was reasonable.
On remand (pre-Gall), the district court varied again, but only down to 36 months. In doing so, it indicated that any greater variance would only result in another reversal from the Fourth. At a post-sentencing bond hearing, the court said if it were not "laboring under the Fourth Circuit's constraints I would have done something considerably different." Not surprisingly, Curry appealed. Equally unsurprisingly, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the sentence. Noting that it could only pass judgment on the sentence actually given ("That the district court judge expressed frustration with the law does not make the law any less binding"), the court concluded that the 36-month sentence imposed by the district court was reasonable.
Cocaine Purchase for Personal Use Triggers 843(b) Liability
US v. Abuelhawa: A was charged and convicted of using a communication facility to facilitate a crime, the distribution of cocaine, in violation of 21 USC 843(b). The conviction was based on a two groups of phone calls between Abuelhawa and Said, from whom Abuelhawa purchased cocaine. After he was arrested, Abuelhawa gave a statement in which he explained that Said was his dealer. Abuelhawa was sentenced to 24 months in prison.
On appeal, Abuelhawa unsuccessfully made two arguments. First, he argued that a conviction under 843(b) couldn't be sustained if the crime that was facilitated was the simple distribution of drugs for personal use. Noting that the circuits are split on this issue, the Fourth Circuit focused in on what it meant to "facilitate" a crime, giving that word its plain meaning. The court also noted that the statute prohibits the use of the communication facility to commit a felony, but doe not identify whose felony it must facilitate. As a result, the court concluded that Abuelhawa's use of the phone facilitated Said's distribution of cocaine to him, as it made the distribution easier. That Abuelhawa's simple possession of cocaine is not a felony is "simply irrelevant." Second, Abuelhawa argued that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction because any actual distribution of cocaine as a result of the two sets of phone calls. After reviewing the evidence, the Fourth Circuit rejected that argument and affirmed Abuelhawa's conviction.
On appeal, Abuelhawa unsuccessfully made two arguments. First, he argued that a conviction under 843(b) couldn't be sustained if the crime that was facilitated was the simple distribution of drugs for personal use. Noting that the circuits are split on this issue, the Fourth Circuit focused in on what it meant to "facilitate" a crime, giving that word its plain meaning. The court also noted that the statute prohibits the use of the communication facility to commit a felony, but doe not identify whose felony it must facilitate. As a result, the court concluded that Abuelhawa's use of the phone facilitated Said's distribution of cocaine to him, as it made the distribution easier. That Abuelhawa's simple possession of cocaine is not a felony is "simply irrelevant." Second, Abuelhawa argued that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction because any actual distribution of cocaine as a result of the two sets of phone calls. After reviewing the evidence, the Fourth Circuit rejected that argument and affirmed Abuelhawa's conviction.
Wednesday, April 23, 2008
No Jury Finding on Drug Weight Doesn't Undermine Guilty Verdict
US v. Reid: Reid and his co-defendants were charged with (among other things), conspiracy to distribute more than 50 grams of crack and murder. Reid acted as a sort of middle man, purchasing powder cocaine for conversion into crack as well as amounts of crack that were then sold to street-level dealers. After being arrested on state charges, Reid told co-defendants he thought he was set up by an informant, who was eventually murdered. Reid's role in the actual killing was to provide transportation and disposal of the murder weapon. At trial, Reid was convicted, but on the crack count the jury did not return a verdict indicated the specific amount of crack involved. He was sentenced to 240 months in prison on the conspiracy charge and life on the murder charge.
On appeal, Reid argued (via plain error) that the district court's instructions left the jury with three options: convict of conspiracy involving more than 50 grams of crack, convict of more than 5 but less than 50 grams of crack, or acquit. The Fourth Circuit agreed, in a strange way, holding that the district court did indeed err in its instructions to the jury, but only because it tied the crack amounts to a "guilty" verdict in the first place. As the Fourth explains:
in order to obtain a conviction on Count 1, the government was required to prove that (1) an agreement to possess cocaine with intent to distribute existed between two or more persons; (2) Reid knew of the conspiracy; and (3) Reid knowingly and voluntarily became a part of this conspiracy. In instructing the jury that a specific drug quantity was an element of conviction under § 841(a), the district court misstated the law and heightened the government’s burden of proof.
(citation omitted). So there was error and it was plain, but Reid could not show prejudice because the sentence he received on that count (240 months) was the maximum allowed for a conviction without regard to a specific amount of crack. The court also rejected Reid's sufficiency challenge to his convictions.
On appeal, Reid argued (via plain error) that the district court's instructions left the jury with three options: convict of conspiracy involving more than 50 grams of crack, convict of more than 5 but less than 50 grams of crack, or acquit. The Fourth Circuit agreed, in a strange way, holding that the district court did indeed err in its instructions to the jury, but only because it tied the crack amounts to a "guilty" verdict in the first place. As the Fourth explains:
in order to obtain a conviction on Count 1, the government was required to prove that (1) an agreement to possess cocaine with intent to distribute existed between two or more persons; (2) Reid knew of the conspiracy; and (3) Reid knowingly and voluntarily became a part of this conspiracy. In instructing the jury that a specific drug quantity was an element of conviction under § 841(a), the district court misstated the law and heightened the government’s burden of proof.
(citation omitted). So there was error and it was plain, but Reid could not show prejudice because the sentence he received on that count (240 months) was the maximum allowed for a conviction without regard to a specific amount of crack. The court also rejected Reid's sufficiency challenge to his convictions.
Wednesday, April 16, 2008
Double Jeopardy No Bar to Arson, Mail Fraud, and Use of Fire Convictions
US v. Martin: Martin was the owner of an unsuccessful convenience store in Virginia. She was deep in debt, both the creditors and the commonwealth, and failed when she tried to sell the business. Unfortunately, at that point, she told others that she would "torch" the store "if she had the guts" and that "it's not going to be long and I'm not going to have to worry about any of it anyway." Ultimately, the store burned down. After collecting insurance proceeds for the fire, Martin was charged with staging the whole thing for her benefit. Specifically, she was charged with arson, using fire to commit another felony, mail fraud, and making false statements. She was convicted by a jury on all charges.
On appeal, Martin raised two arguments. First, she argued that the evidence was insufficient to sustain convictions for arson and use of fire. The Fourth Circuit rejected that argument, noting that while there was no direct evidence linking Martin to the fire, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence (motive, she was the last person in the building, lying to investigators) for a reasonable jury to conclude that she was guilty. Second, martin argued that her simultaneous convictions for arson, use of fire, and mail fraud violated the Double Jeopardy clause. Again, the Fourth Circuit disagreed, holding that separate sentence for use of fire was clearly meant to apply as punishment in addition to the underlying crime (mail fraud, in this case) and that arson and use of fire are separate offenses when analyzed under the Blockburger test.
On appeal, Martin raised two arguments. First, she argued that the evidence was insufficient to sustain convictions for arson and use of fire. The Fourth Circuit rejected that argument, noting that while there was no direct evidence linking Martin to the fire, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence (motive, she was the last person in the building, lying to investigators) for a reasonable jury to conclude that she was guilty. Second, martin argued that her simultaneous convictions for arson, use of fire, and mail fraud violated the Double Jeopardy clause. Again, the Fourth Circuit disagreed, holding that separate sentence for use of fire was clearly meant to apply as punishment in addition to the underlying crime (mail fraud, in this case) and that arson and use of fire are separate offenses when analyzed under the Blockburger test.
Monday, April 14, 2008
Civil Arrest Does Not Start Speed Trial Clock
US v. Rodriguez-Amaya: Rodriguez-Amaya was deported in 1998 to El Salvador following a conviction in Virginia for sexual assault. He returned to the United States without permission and was arrested by ICE on May 17, 2005. On June 6, 2005, Rodriguez-Amaya's custody was transferred from ICE to Virginia, which sought to prosecute him for failure to register as a sex offender. While in Virginia custody, a federal criminal warrant charging Rodriguez-Amaya with illegal reentry was obtained on July 21, 2005. Rodriguez-Amaya was returned to ICE custody on October 7, 2005. It was not until October 27, 2005, that the outstanding criminal warrant was executed and Rodriguez-Amaya was transferred to the USMS. On November 23, 2005, Rodriguez-Amaya was indicted. Prior to trial, he moved to dismiss the indictment under the Speed Trial Act due to the delay from being returned to ICE custody on October 7 to indictment on November 23. The district court denied the motion, convicted Rodriguez-Amaya, and sentenced him to 41 months in prison.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Rodriguez-Amaya's motion. The court held that the Speedy Trial Act clock did not start running until the federal criminal warrant was executed on October 27. The court followed the lead of other Circuits and concluded that the civil detention, as in this case by ICE, does not trigger the running of the STA clock. However, the court also held that there is a "ruse exception" to that rule, which applies when "the 'primary or exclusive purpose of the civil detention was to hold [a defendant] for future criminal prosecution.'" The court had "little trouble" concluding that there was no evidence of such shenanigans in this case.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Rodriguez-Amaya's motion. The court held that the Speedy Trial Act clock did not start running until the federal criminal warrant was executed on October 27. The court followed the lead of other Circuits and concluded that the civil detention, as in this case by ICE, does not trigger the running of the STA clock. However, the court also held that there is a "ruse exception" to that rule, which applies when "the 'primary or exclusive purpose of the civil detention was to hold [a defendant] for future criminal prosecution.'" The court had "little trouble" concluding that there was no evidence of such shenanigans in this case.
Court Defines "Abuse" in Sex Offnse/Immigration Context
US v. Diaz-Ibarra: Diaz-Ibarra was deported in 1995 following his conviction in Georgia for committing an "immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of a" minor. After returning to the United States without permission, Diaz-Ibarra pleaded guilty to illegal reentry following an aggravated felony. At sentencing, the probation officer recommended that Diaz-Ibarra's sentence be increased 16 levels because his Georgia conviction constituted a crime of violence under USSG 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). The district court overruled Diaz-Ibarra's objection and applied the enhancement, sentencing him to 78 months in prison.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed, concluding that Diaz-Ibarra's prior conviction was a crime of violence. Specifically, "crime of violence" in 2L1.2 is defined as including "sexual abuse of a minor." Diaz-Ibarra conceded that his offense was "sexual" and involved a minor, but argued but it was not "abuse." Applying a definition of abuse that goes well beyond the common sense one, the court concluded that "abuse" included situations where there is no physical contact between the assailant and minor where the assailant intends to gratify himself sexually, regardless of the effect on the victim. Given that definition, Diaz-Ibarra's Georgia conviction constituted sexual abuse of a minor and, thus, a crime of violence.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed, concluding that Diaz-Ibarra's prior conviction was a crime of violence. Specifically, "crime of violence" in 2L1.2 is defined as including "sexual abuse of a minor." Diaz-Ibarra conceded that his offense was "sexual" and involved a minor, but argued but it was not "abuse." Applying a definition of abuse that goes well beyond the common sense one, the court concluded that "abuse" included situations where there is no physical contact between the assailant and minor where the assailant intends to gratify himself sexually, regardless of the effect on the victim. Given that definition, Diaz-Ibarra's Georgia conviction constituted sexual abuse of a minor and, thus, a crime of violence.
Friday, April 11, 2008
Supreme Court's Decision in Lopez Applies at Sentencing
US v. Matamoros-Modesta: Matamoros-Modesta pleaded guilty to illegal reentry. At sentencing, it was determined that he had previously been deported following an "aggravated felony" conviction, in Texas, for possession of cocaine. As a result, his offense level doubled and he was sentenced to 37 months in prison. Between plea and sentencing, the Supreme Court decided Lopez v. Gonzales, 127 S.Ct. 625 (2006), in which the Court held that, in the immigration context, a prior conviction for a drug offense that was a felony offense under state law but not the Controlled Substances Act was not an "aggravated felony." But nobody noticed, so the aggravated sentence was imposed.
On appeal, the Government and defense agreed that the district court plainly erred by imposing the enhanced sentence. The Fourth Circuit agreed, as well, following the lead of numerous other courts in importing Lopez's holding into the sentencing process. It therefore vacated Matamoros-Modesta's sentence and remanded for resentencing.
Congrats to the WDNC FPD office on the win!
On appeal, the Government and defense agreed that the district court plainly erred by imposing the enhanced sentence. The Fourth Circuit agreed, as well, following the lead of numerous other courts in importing Lopez's holding into the sentencing process. It therefore vacated Matamoros-Modesta's sentence and remanded for resentencing.
Congrats to the WDNC FPD office on the win!
Tuesday, April 08, 2008
Failure to Inform Defendant of Possible ACCA Impact Requires Vacation of Guilty Plea
US v. Hairston: Hairston was charged with 31 separate offenses, including 14 felon-in-possession charges and 8 924(c) charges. He entered into a plea agreement by which he pleaded guilty to two of the 924(c) charges, with the other six dismissed, and all the other offenses. The parties agreed that with the application of the 924(c) mandatory sentences, he was subject to a term of at least 30 years in prison. However, prior to sentencing it was discovered that Hairston qualified as an Armed Career Criminal, which subjected him to a term of at least 45 years in prison (30 years on the 924(c) charges plus 15 for any of the felon-in-possession charges). At sentencing, the Government admitted that the parties "overlooked" the possibility of the ACCA applying. Hairston himself objected to a 45-year sentence and asked to withdraw his plea. The district court denied the motion, noting that Hairston was never promised he would only receive a 30-year sentence and that his Guideline range on the various offenses, without taking the ACCA into account, was 168-210 months. Therefore, any confusion about the potential sentence was "not significant."
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded. Hairston argued that the district court failed in not notifying him at the plea hearing that he could be subject to a 15-year term on the felon-in-possession charges. The Government conceded the error. The Fourth Circuit agreed, noting that while Rule 11 does not require courts to inform defendants of what Guideline range they might face, it does require notification of any applicable statutory ranges. Furthermore, the error was not harmless. Without the ACCA enhancement, the district court could have imposed a minimal non-Guideline sentence on the counts without mandatory minimum sentences, effectively sentencing Hairston to only(!) 30 years in prison. For a remedy, the Fourth Circuit vacated Hairston's guilty plea with respect to all counts, not just the felon-in-possession counts, as requested by the Government.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded. Hairston argued that the district court failed in not notifying him at the plea hearing that he could be subject to a 15-year term on the felon-in-possession charges. The Government conceded the error. The Fourth Circuit agreed, noting that while Rule 11 does not require courts to inform defendants of what Guideline range they might face, it does require notification of any applicable statutory ranges. Furthermore, the error was not harmless. Without the ACCA enhancement, the district court could have imposed a minimal non-Guideline sentence on the counts without mandatory minimum sentences, effectively sentencing Hairston to only(!) 30 years in prison. For a remedy, the Fourth Circuit vacated Hairston's guilty plea with respect to all counts, not just the felon-in-possession counts, as requested by the Government.
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