US v. Patterson:
Patterson was in a local jail while also serving a term of supervised release
when his cellmate overdosed and was taken to the hospital. Patterson was eventually
charged with violating his conditions of supervised release by possessing
heroin and Xanax with intent to distribute as a result of that incident. He
denied the charges and the district court held a contested revocation hearing
in which it heard testimony from the cellmate (he got better) and others. The district
court concluded that Patterson had provided the drugs the cellmate used to
overdose, revoked his term of supervised release, and imposed a term of 39
months in prison.
Case summaries and analysis from Federal Defender Offices located in the Fourth Circuit (WV, VA, MD, NC, SC)
Monday, May 04, 2020
No Need to Specify Evidence Upon Which Supervised Release Revocation Is Based
Monday, April 27, 2020
Court Must Apply Retroactive Law to Career Offender Designation in 1SA Proceeding
US v. Chambers: In
2005 Chambers was convicted as a career offender to 262 months in prison after
being convicted of a crack conspiracy. Two of his prior predicate convictions
were for North Carolina drug offenses for which, because of the state’s
then-existing guideline scheme, he did not actually face a maximum sentence of
more than one year. Under Fourth Circuit law at the time, however, they counted
as predicates. More recently, Chambers filed for relief under the First Step
Act’s retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act and argued that the
district court should correct the original career offender designation in light
of Simmons. The district court
declined to do so and did not reduce Chambers’ sentence.
A divided Fourth Circuit reversed the
district court. The court rejected the Government’s position that the 1SA only
allowed the district court to make “statutory Fair Sentencing Act adjustments
and preclude[d] it from correcting Guideline errors,” noting that Section 404(b)
of the 1SA uses the term “impose” a sentence, rather than “modify” or “reduce.”
When imposing a sentence “a court does not simply adjust the statutory
minimums; it must also recalculate the Guideline range.” Unlike the language of
18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), there are no limitations on doing do under 3582(c)(1),
the mechanism for applying the 1SA. Of particular import in this case was that
the change in the law that occurred in Simmons
had been made retroactive, so that the career offender designation was “as
wrong today as it was in 2005.” The court also explained (in noting Government
concessions) that the usual 3553(a) factors apply in 1SA proceedings and that
courts may consider a defendant’s post-sentencing conduct in determining
whether and to what extent to reduce a sentence.
Congrats to the Defender office in Western NC on the win!
Abandonment, Search Pursuant to Arrest Save Gun Conviction
US v. Ferebee: Ferebee
was at the home of a friend who was on probation when officers arrived to
perform a warrantless search. Ferebee was sitting on a sofa, smoking marijuana,
against which a black backpack was resting. He stood up, “picked up the
backpack with his left hand, and held it out as another officer” patted him
down (finding nothing). When asked if there were any weapons in the bag,
Ferebee “stated that the bag was not actually his.” Ferebee was arrested for
marijuana possession and taken outside while another officer searched the
backpack, in which they found a gun. Ferebee later gave a statement where he
said that the backpack, and the gun, were his. He unsuccessfully moved to
suppress the gun, then entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of being
a felon in possession of a firearm.
A divided Fourth Circuit affirmed the
dismissal of Ferebee’s motion to suppress. First, the court agreed with the
district court that Ferebee had no “standing” to challenge the search of the
bag because he said that it wasn’t his. Specifically, the court rejected
Ferebee’s attempt to utilize the collective knowledge doctrine, holding that it
did not matter that the officer who searched the bag was not the one to whom Ferebee
said the bag was not his. That is because the issue of abandonment of property “focuses
solely on the intent of the defendant,” while “the collective-knowledge
doctrine focuses solely on the knowledge of the police officers.” Here the “abandonment
was complete when Ferebee told [the first officer[ that the backpack was not
his.” The court also held that the district court’s conclusion that Ferebee had
abandoned the backpack was not clearly erroneous. Second, the court held that
even if Ferebee had standing the search was proper as done incident to a lawful
arrest. Even though Ferebee was handcuffed and outside the house when the
backpack was searched inside, the court concluded that there was “no impediment
to Ferebee’s movement beyond the handcuffs” and it was “clear from the video”
that he was “only a few feet outside the house and thus could reach the other
officers and the backpack within seconds.”
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