Monday, April 27, 2020

District Court Sufficiently Explained Upward Variance


US v. Nance: Nance was at the scene when police responded to a noise complaint, then fled when they announced they were going to apply for warrants to search the home. Officers eventually found multiple types of drugs in Nance’s car. He was arrested later that day on state charges and released. Two days later, Nance was arrested after police responded to a domestic dispute call and this time was found to be in possession of a handgun as well as drugs. He was arrested on state charges and released. Nance eventually pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent and one count of possessing a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking offense. His advisory Guideline range was 21 to 27 months on the drug count, plus a 60-month consecutive term on the gun count. The district court imposed a total sentence of 123 months in prison – 63 months on the drug count and the mandatory 60 months on the gun count.

The Fourth Circuit affirmed Nance’s sentence. Nance argued that the sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable. As to procedural reasonableness, the court rejected Nance’s argument that the district court did not sufficiently explain the sentence it imposed, particularly the upward variance/departure on the drug count. It did so because the district court “conducted a thorough sentencing hearing, engaging defense counsel’s arguments, explaining where it found them wanting, and recessing so that additional relevant information could be considered.” The district court also “imposed a sentence individualized to Nance, taking into account” his history and characteristics. As to substantive reasonableness, the court concluded that the district court did not put undue weight on Nance’s older criminal history (including juvenile convictions) that involved violent offenses. It also noted that the sentence imposed, while an upward variance, was well below the sentence requested by the Government.

Tuesday, April 21, 2020

Prejudicial IAC Where Defendant Who Entered Open Plea Wanted Appeal


US v. Akande: Akande was charged with “counts arising from a bank fraud conspiracy” and filed a motion to suppress some of the evidence against him. The motion was denied and he then entered a guilty plea without a plea agreement. He then sought to withdraw the guilty plea, arguing that his counsel had misinformed him that he could pursue an appeal of the suppression issue after entering a non-conditional guilty plea. Before ruling on the motion to withdraw the plea, Akande go new counsel who withdrew the motion to withdraw and proceeded to sentencing. Akande’s 199-month sentence was affirmed on appeal.

Akande filed a 2255 motion arguing that both of his counsel had been ineffective. Particularly, his first counsel’s incorrect advice that he could pursue an appeal of the suppression issue after entering an open guilty plea had prejudiced him. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Akande couldn’t show prejudice.

The Fourth Circuit reversed. Noting that everyone agreed that Akande’s first counsel provided incorrect advice (the court didn’t reach the IAC allegations against his second attorney), the court then rejected the Government’s argument that the district court’s colloquy with Akande at the plea hearing cured that incorrect advice. Because the advice was particular to appealing the suppression issue, the district court’s more general information about what Akande was waiving by pleading guilty could not cure there error. Furthermore, Akande showed he was prejudiced because there was sufficient evidence in the record to show that preserving his right to appeal the suppression issue was a prime concern and that, had he known he had to go to trial to preserve it, he would have.

Venue Proper In SORNA Case In District Defendant Left


US v. Spivey: Spivey was required to register as a sex offender under SORNA. He was living in North Carolina, and had properly registered, but moved to Colorado without updating his registration. He was then indicted in the Eastern District of NC for a SORNA violation. He moved to dismiss the indictment for lack of venue, arguing that he could only be charged in the District of Colorado. The district court denied his motion and he entered a conditional guilty plea.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of Spivey’s motion to dismiss. The court noted that issues of venue turn on whether “circumstance” or “conduct” elements of the offense occur in a particular district, with the conduct elements of prime importance. The court then rejected Spivey’s argument that interstate travel for SORNA offenses was merely a jurisdictional element and thus was not a “conduct” element (as opposed to the actual failure to register/update in the new district). The Supreme Court had already held, the court pointed out, that interstate travel was “an essential conduct element” for a SORNA conviction.