Tuesday, April 14, 2020

No Mandamus to Require Recusal Prior to Trial for Potential Sentencing Conflict


In re: Moore: Moore was charged with Hobbs Act robbery and firearms offenses. Due to prior convictions that could subject him to a mandatory life sentence under the “three strikes” law, depending on which counts he was convicted of at trial. Even if he was convicted of all counts at trial, he could escape the mandatory life sentence if the district court made certain factual findings about his prior offenses at sentencing. As it happens, the judge assigned to Moore’s case was the AUSA who prosecuted him on one of those prior offenses. Moore moved the judge to recuse himself (the Government did not object) and the motion was denied.

Moore filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the Fourth Circuit, seeking an order for the judge to recuse himself from Moore’s case immediately, before trial. The Fourth Circuit declined to grant the motion, holding that Moore could not meet the high standard necessary for obtaining mandamus relief. The court noted that any conflict the judge might have with Moore would only ripen at sentencing, where the district court could be required to make factual findings about a case the judge himself prosecuted. Noting a circuit split on whether a judge in such a case must recuse themselves before trial or only prior to sentencing (where the conflict has ripened), the court concluded Moore could not show a “clear and indisputable” right to relief. If Moore is convicted at trial and faces the three-strikes sentence and the judge then fails to recuse, Moore can appeal from the judgment entered after sentencing.

No Categorical Approach for VICAR Predicates


US v. Keene: Keene and his codefendants were charged with (among other things) three counts of committing violent crimes in aid of racketeering activity (VICAR), particularly the federal offense of assault with a dangerous weapon and Virginia offense of brandishing a firearm. Prior to trial they moved to dismiss those counts, arguing that applying a categorical approach (which the Government agreed was required) the federal and state offenses did not match. The district court agreed and dismissed those counts.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court. After scolding the Government for reversing its position on whether the categorical approach was required (but nonetheless allowing it to do so without hindrance), the court concluded that the categorical approach was not required for VICAR predicate offenses. The court reached that conclusion because the language of the VICAR statute did not include the same kind of “textual clues” as other statues where courts had concluded that the categorical approach was required, such as terms like “offense,” “elements,” or “conviction.”

Tuesday, April 07, 2020

Police Follow-Up Search of Laptop By Private Party OK


US v. Fall: Fall’s niece and her boyfriend were staying with him when they discovered what appeared to be child pornography on one of Fall’s laptops. They took the laptop to police, who looked at a few of the thumbnails and concluded that the images were child pornography. After Fall invoked his right to remain silent the police obtains warrants to search the laptop and Fall’s home. The warrant affidavit included the information police learned from their initial review of the laptop as well as information from a neighbor that, while police were securing Fall’s home prior to executing the warrant, the neighbor saw Fall crawl out a second-story roof, try to throw something away, and flee. In truth, the neighbor could not identify the man they saw. The execution of the warrants uncovered additional child pornography. Fall unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence seized by the police and was convicted at trial of three counts of receipt of child pornography, two counts of possession, and one count of transportation.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Fall’s conviction, addressing several issues related to child pornography cases along the way. First, the court concluded that the district court did not err in denying Fall’s motion to suppress. The court sidestepped Fall’s argument that the initial police search of the laptop was broader than the private search done by Fall’s niece and boyfriend. After noting a circuit split on how the private search doctrine applied to computer evidence, the court eventually concluded that Fall failed under the good faith exception, since the search warrant was not “facially deficient,” even with the evidence that might have exceeded the scope of the private search was excised. The same was true of the false statement about what the neighbor saw. Second, the court rejected Fall’s argument that his possession count was multiplicitous of the three receipt counts, holding that the charged offenses occurred at different times (months apart). Third, the court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to sustain Fall’s conviction for transportation of child pornography even though the evidence only showed that he moved the file from his laptop to an online cloud storage account. In doing so, the court distinguished transportation and distribution, which requires a recipient. Finally, the court concluded there was sufficient evidence to sustain Fall’s receipt counts, even though the images involved were found in temporary internet files.