Wednesday, March 25, 2020

Multi-Drug Cases Involving Crack Are “Covered Offenses”


US v. Gravatt: In 2001, Gravatt was convicted of conspiracy to distribute both crack and powder cocaine in sufficient amounts to trigger a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years in prison and a maximum of life. He was sentenced to 292 months, later reduced to 260. He moved for a further reduction under the First Step Act’s retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act. The district court denied his motion, holding that while his crack offense would otherwise be a “covered offense” under the 1SA and make him eligible for a reduction, because his powder offense was not such an offense and produced the same statutory range, he had not been convicted of a covered offense.

The Fourth Circuit reversed. It concluded that the covered offense analysis was a simple one and that Congress had not placed any limitations on a defendant’s eligibility aside from those specifically listed in the 1SA itself. Since those exceptions did not address multi-drug cases like Williamson’s, those convictions were covered offenses.

Congrats to the Defender office in South Carolina on the win!

Monday, March 16, 2020

Traffic Control Checkpoint Doesn’t Violate Fourth Amendment


US v. Moore: Moore was driving in “the early morning hours” in Columbus County, North Carolina when he came upon a checkpoint operated by the local sheriff’s department. The goal of the checkpoint was to ensure compliance with state vehicle regulations and required every vehicle to be stopped. Aside from traffic violations, officers “were permitted to detain motorists . . . only if the deputy became aware of other facts suggesting criminal activity.” Officers observed what appeared to be bullet holes on Moore’s car and, when it was stopped, “immediately noticed the odor of marijuana and saw smoke emitting from the passenger area.” Moore eventually consented to a search of his car, which uncovered drugs, guns, and ammunition.  Moore unsuccessfully sought to suppress that evidence and pleaded guilty to possession of crack with intent to distribute it.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Moore’s conviction. The only issue Moore raised was that “the initial stop of his vehicle . . . was unconstitutional.” The court disagreed, first holding that the checkpoint had a “valid primary purpose,” that is, traffic enforcement and was not motivated by a “general interest in crime control.” Second, the court held that the checkpoint was  reasonable because it furthered that valid purpose and was minimally intrusive. That the department lacked a written policy for the checkpoint didn’t matter. However, the court did emphasize “the limits of our holding,” because there “are no indications in the record of roving vehicular spot checks” in which case “courts would bring the leash up short.”

First Step Act’s Revised 924(c) Penalties Don’t Apply Retroactively


US v Jordan: Jordan was convicted of (among other things) two counts of possessing a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c). At sentencing, Jordan made two arguments to seek relief from the mandatory minimum sentences those convictions required. First, he argued that the district court should merge the two charges for sentencing, triggering only one mandatory minimum sentence. Second, he argued that the First Step Act’s revised “stacking” penalties should apply to his case. The district court rejected both arguments and sentenced Jordan to a total of 420 months in prison, including a 60-month term on one gun charge and a 300-month term on the other.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Jordan’s convictions and sentence. As to the merger argument, the court noted that while other courts have accepted the premise of Jordan’s argument – “that the use of a firearm, in the simultaneous commission of two predicate drug trafficking offenses, will not support separate 924(c) convictions and sentences” – the Fourth Circuit had already “squarely rejected this position.” Instead, the Fourth Circuit had previously held that two convictions and sentences may stand “so long as they are based on separate predicate offenses that are not duplicative under a double jeopardy analysis.” As to the First Step Act, the court joined the other Circuits that have held that the plain language of the statute controls and it applies only to offenses where sentences had not yet been imposed at the time the First Step Act was enacted (the Act passed while Jordan’s appeal was pending).