Daugherty v. Dingess: Daugherty was charged in West Virginia court with 16 counts related to four incidents in which he allegedly sexually abused his son. He went to trial on 12 counts (four were dropped prior to trial) and was acquitted on the eight substantive counts of sexual assault and abuse, but was convicted of four counts of sexual abuse by a parent or guardian.
After trial, it was discovered that a juror had said, during deliberations, that he knew Daugherty and his family and that he feared what might happen to he and his family should Daugherty by acquitted (a fear he said his fellow jurors should share). The trial court denied a motion for new trial, concluding that the juror’s statements weren’t extrinsic to the deliberations and not a Sixth Amendment violation. The WV Supreme Court agreed. Daugherty sought relief under §2254 in federal court, but the district court denied the petition, concluding that the WV Supreme Court had not unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent to the issue.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of Daugherty’s §2254 petition. The court noted that Daugherty’s argument was that the lower courts had erred by considering the juror’s two statements in isolation, rather than as a whole that gave them a certain meaning (i.e., that the juror had outside information based on his knowledge of Daugherty’s family and it informed his fears), but ultimately concluded that it did not need to decide that issue. Rather, regardless of how the statements were considered, they did not meet the Supreme Court’s standard for improper extrinsic influence on jury deliberations. The court concluded that the juror’s statements came from his own mental processes and could not be considered equivalent to information originating from “non-jury figures.”
NOTE: I was counsel for Daugherty in this appeal.
No comments:
Post a Comment