US v. Crawley: In 2016, Crawley was sentenced to 188 months following a drug trafficking conviction, having been designated as a career offender. One of his predicate “crimes of violence” was a 2009 conviction for robbery in Virginia. Crawley unsuccessfully filed a pair of “compassionate release” motions under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) related to COVID. Then, following the Fourth Circuit’s decision in White, in which it held that Virginia robbery did not qualify as a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act, he filed another motion, arguing that he would no longer be classified as a career offender and the resulting disparity between his sentence and what he would receive now constituted an “extraordinary and compelling” basis for relief. After the Sentencing Commission had amended the applicable policy statements, the district court denied Crawley’s motion.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial. First, the court decided that the amended Guidelines (which were more limited in terms of relief for such sentencing disparities) did apply, even though Crawley’s motion was filed before they took effect. The language of the relevant statutes are in the present tense, speaking to the responsibility of courts to apply the currently applicable policy statements. Second, the court decided that there was a sentencing disparity because White applied to the Guideline definition of “crime of violence” and, therefore, Virginia robbery no longer qualifies as a career offender predicate. Finally, however, the court concluded that Crawley was not eligible for relief, as the amended Guideline precluded sentencing disparity relief for those who had “served at least 10 years of the term of imprisonment.” The court held that time frame pointed to time actually served on a sentence, the length of sentence imposed, and thus it did not involve any calculation of good time or similar credits. Because Crawley had not served 10 years, he could not get relief.
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