Friday, February 28, 2025

“Standard” Conditions of Probation Affirmed After Procedural, Substantive Challenges

US v. Notgrass: Rhonda Notgrass and her husband, Robert, pleaded guilty to misdemeanor fraud after fraudulently obtaining unemployment payments during the COVID lockdown. They pled pursuant to a plea agreement in which they waived their right to appeal their “sentence of imprisonment, fine or term of supervised release” or the “manner in which the sentence was determined.” They were sentenced to 60 months probation, which included numerous conditions, to which they objected to three: (1) that they not leave the district without permissions, (2) that they not possess dangerous weapons (although Rhonda was allowed to possess pepper spray or mace), and (3) that if unemployed they register with Work Force West Virginia (by the time of sentencing, they had relocated to Missouri). Robert additionally objected to a condition mandating participation in mental health treatment if ordered by his probation officer. The district court imposed all of them, largely on the basis that they were “appropriate.”

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the imposition of the conditions of probation. First, the court denied the Government’s motion to dismiss the appeal under the appeal waiver from the plea agreement. That, the court held, was explicitly limited by its plain language to sentences of imprisonment and supervised release and made no mention of probation (or conditions thereof). The court then turned to the procedural reasonableness of the contested conditions, concluding that the explanation provided by the district court was adequate. Although none of the conditions were mandatory under the statute, the first two were “standard” conditions set forth in the Guidelines and thus required little explanation from the district court when imposed. The other conditions were more specifically related to the convictions and Robert’s history and characteristics, and thus adequately explained. For largely the same reasons (i.e., they were “standard” conditions and connected to the offenses and history) the court also found that the conditions were substantively reasonable.

NOTE: I was counsel for Rhonda Notgrass in this appeal.

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