Court Divides on Extension of Traffic Stop

US v. Smart: Smart was pulled over in Louisiana in 2017 by a state trooper. The trooper was suspicious because Smart “seemed nervous,” could “provide only ‘clunky’ answers to questions,” and had a gas can in his car. The trooper ran his drug dog around the car. It alerted and 5.6 kilograms of cocaine were recovered from the car. Additional investigation, including search of homes in Virginia and North Carolina, led to Smart being indicted for conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute it, along with other drug and firearm offenses. At trial, Smart was acquitted on the firearm charge, but convicted on all others, and sentenced to a term of 360 months in prison.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Smart’s convictions. Smart’s main argument on appeal was that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence from the initial Louisiana traffic stop, contending that the trooper lacked the suspicion needed to extend the stop to allow his drug dog to be run around the car. The court disagreed, holding that the totality of circumstances showed reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop. In particular, the court deferred to the trooper’s explanation of why the gas can in the car was suspicious (in his experience, drug traffickers frequently take extra gas with them so they will not have to stop as often on the return trip), specifically noting that the district court found the trooper’s “testimony credible and relied on it.” The court also noted that Hart was not merely described as “nervous” but “extremely nervous,” conclusions that were backed up by the trooper’s observations of Smart during the stop.

Judge Traxler wrote a concurring opinion, diving more deeply into the record to “highlight the additional evidence that was presented at the suppression hearing that supports the district court’s decision.” Judge Wynn, however, wrote a dissenting opinion, arguing that the “majority opinion makes critical errors in its analysis – errors that will reverberate far beyond this case” because “it defers to a police officer’s (apparently unassailable) expertise on innocuous facts to find reasonable suspicion where there is none.” The “ultimate result” of that analysis is that “little more than a driver’s nervousness and the presence of a can of gas now offer open invitations for police officers to invade drivers’ privacy.”