Court Splits on Nature of Statute of Limitations for Money Laundering Conspiracy

 US v. Ravenell: Ravenell was a criminal defense attorney who was charged with various offenses related to his involvement with drug trafficking clients. At trial he was convicted of only one charge – conspiracy to commit money laundering. At issue during trial, at various stages, was whether the Government had proven that the conspiracy continued until it was within the applicable statute of limitations. Ravenell requested that the jury be instructed that the Government had to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, than at least one overt act occurred within the limitations period. After that was rejected, he sought a revised instruction that reduced the standard to a preponderance of the evidence and dropped the reference to an overt act. That instruction was also rejected. The district court also rejected Ravenell’s motions for acquittal on that ground, holding that the Government had proven that the conspiracy continued into the limitations period and Ravenell had not provided any evidence of withdrawal.

On appeal, a divided Fourth Circuit affirmed Ravenell’s conviction. The court noted that whether an offense was committed within the statute of limitations period was not an element of a conspiracy defense, but an affirmative defense. With that in mind, there was no error in not giving Ravenell’s proposed instructions because they were not correct statements of law. The initial requested instruction referenced an overt act, but the Supreme Court has held that money laundering conspiracy does not have an overt act element. The revised instruction was also incorrect because if the issue was an element, then the preponderance standard would not have applied. The court also concluded that the district court did not err by failing to give any instruction on the statute of limitations because, given the nature of non-overt act conspiracies, the defendant was required to present some evidence of the conspiracy’s termination, which Ravenell did not provide.

Chief Judge Gregory dissented, arguing that the majority’s conclusion that the proposed instructions were “legally deficient” was overly “formulaic.”