No Exclusionary Rule for Violation of Immigration Statute Requiring Warrant for Arrest

US v. Santos-Portillo: Santos-Portillo was arrested, without a warrant, by an Homeland Security agent who recognized him from when he was previously deported from the United States. After receiving Miranda warnings, Santos-Portillo admitted he was from Honduras, had been removed from the United States before, and did not have permission to return. After he was charged with illegal reentry, Santos-Portillo moved to suppress “all post-arrest evidence” because under 8 USC 1357(a) which allows warrantless arrests in immigration situations only where it is likely that the suspect will escape before a warrant can be obtained. The motion was denied and Santos-Portillo entered a conditional guilty plea before begin sentenced to 15 months in prison.

On appeal, a divided Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress. Both parties agreed that there was no risk Santos-Portillo would flee and no warrant was obtained, thus a “legal requirement has . . . been violated.” The only question was “what remedy is available . . . or whether one exists at all for violation of this provision.” The court concluded there was not. It noted that not only was there no exclusionary rule in section 1357, but in other related contexts Congress has provided such a remedy. Likewise, because (Santos-Portillo agreed) the agent had probable cause to make the arrest, there was no Fourth Amendment violation. The court went on to reject Santos-Portillo’s argument that the court had the power to create an exclusionary rule in this situation under the “alleged inherent power to devise remedies for violations of the law by the government.” What may once have been a “freewheeling power . . to create remedies where Congress did not has met only disfavor from the [Supreme] Court itself.” Thus, the “range of cases where courts can on their own suppress evidence for a statutory violation is quite limited.” Even if such authority existed for “egregious or flagrant” violations, such a “vague and open-ended” test would “fail[] on its own terms” here were a “perfectly lawful arrest” was at issue.

Judge Floyd dissented, arguing that the “majority too narrowly views federal courts’ inherent authority to supervise the proceedings before them.”