Prior Commitment During Eventually Dismissed Criminal Case Satisfies 922(g)(4)

 US v. Collins: In 2013, Collins was charged in West Virginia with threatening a judge and prosecutor. The judge determined Collins was incompetent to stand trial and ordered him transported to a mental institution for six months to restore competency. He was found restored, released from the institution, and the criminal charges were eventually dismissed. In 2018, Collins purchased a gun at a local sporting goods store. In filling out the required ATF paperwork, he answered "no" to the question of whether he had ever been committed to a mental institution. Later that day, Collins was arrested and the gun was recovered. He was charged with making a false statement on the ATF form and possession of a firearm by someone who had previously been "adjudicated as a mental defective." He was convicted on both counts at trial and sentenced to 60 months in prison.

 

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Collins' convictions and sentence. The only conviction Collins challenged was the one for possession of the firearm, not making a false statement on the ATF form. Agreeing the Collins had shown Rehaif error in his indictment and jury instructions, the court nonetheless concluded that he suffered no prejudice. That was because the other count of conviction - which Collins did not challenge - required a jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Collins knowingly lied on the ATF form, thus showing that he had the requisite Rehaif-required knowledge on the possession charge. Collins testified at trial that he did not believe he lied on the form, but the jury rejected his testimony (Collins also testified that he had been subject to a commitment order and had even filed a lawsuit over it). The court also, in a footnote, rejected the argument that even though Collins knew he had been committed, he was not aware that his status precluded him from possessing a firearm. The court also rejected Collins' Second Amendment challenge to his conviction and his argument that his 60-month upward variance sentence was procedurally unreasonable.