Warrant Sufficiently Particular to Allow Search that Uncovered CP

US v. Cobb: Cobb was living with his parents and cousin, Wilson, when he and Wilson got into a fight that left Wilson dead. After Cobb was arrested, he called his father and told him to move a laptop from his room and “keep it safe,” that Wilson has “previously used the computer to put some ‘shit’ on it” and asked that his father “wipe down” or clean the computer. He also asked his parents to get his cell phone from the jail. Officers obtained a warrant to search the home and recovered (among other things) a laptop, which they then obtained a second warrant to search. The basis for the warrant was Cobb’s statements on the phone and the warrant allowed for a search of the laptop for “[any material associated with the homicide” of Wilson, as well as “[a]ny and all other evidence of any other crimes.”

Officers searching the laptop uncovered what appeared to child pornography and concluded that “the child pornography was the motive for the murder.” Cobb pleaded guilty to second-degree murder in state court and was indicted for possession of child pornography in federal court. He sought to suppress the CP found during the search of the laptop, but the district court denied that motion. He entered a conditional guilty plea and was sentenced 110 months in prison.

On appeal, a divided Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of Cobb’s motion to suppress. Cobb argued that the second warrant (to search the laptop) was not sufficiently particular because it was not tailored to the particular facts of the homicide and did not narrow down the kinds of files sought or the time period in which they had been created/modified/downloaded. The court disagreed, concluding first that the warrant “specified as much as it could have” by specifying the place to be searched (the laptop) and the things to be seized (evidence related to the homicide). As to the types of files to be searched, the court noted that Cobb did not explain how the warrant could have done that and, regardless, “the Fourth Amendment simply did not demand that the warrant be more specific in this case.” The language at the end about “any and all other evidence” was superfluous and did not impact the court’s Fourth Amendment analysis.

Judge Floyd dissented, arguing that the warrant suffered from a lack of particularity, that the plain-view exception did not apply, and that no good-faith exception applied, either.