No IAC Based on Law at Time of Sentencing

US v. Morris: Morris (aka “Worm”) was convicted in 2013 of conspiracy to distribute coke and crack. He was sentenced as a career offender based, in part, on a 2005 conviction in Virginia for attempted abduction, which was classified as a “crime of violence.” Morris’ counsel did not object to that classification, but did manage to secure a variance sentence of 294 months in prison (below the advisory Guideline range of 360 months to life). Morris later filed a 2255 motion arguing that his counsel had been ineffective for not objecting to the career offender designation because the Virginia conviction was not a crime of violence. The district court denied the motion.

On appeal the Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of Morris’ 2255 motion. Applying the law as it existed in 2013, when Morris was sentenced, the court concluded that his counsel had not been deficient by not objecting to the career offender designation. With both parties agreeing the Virginia conviction did not require an element of force, the issue is whether it fit under either the residual clause or was enveloped in the enumerated (in the commentary) offense of kidnapping. The court concluded that while case law at the time of sentencing “strongly suggested” that the Virginia offense was not generic kidnapping, it could still have qualified as a crime of violence under the residual clause. Not only was the law on that issue unsettled in 2013, it “tilted decidedly in the other direction, making it unlikely (though not inconceivable) that his claim could succeed.” Thus, Morris’ counsel was not deficient because the “relevant precedent” did not “strongly suggest[] that an objection would be warranted.”