Wednesday, November 14, 2018

Specific Identity of Co-Conspirators Not an Element of Offense


USv. Camara: Camara was involved in a fraudulent scheme involving luxury cards that was run by Ekobena. Ekobena used false identities to acquire loans to buy cars, then resold them. Camara bought two of the ten cars Ekobena got and facilitated three other transactions For his trouble, Camara was charged with conspiring to commit fraud and stolen vehicle offenses “with Ekobena and others, known and unknown.” At trial, however, the jury asked if they had to agree that Camara was conspiring with Ekobena “specifically or conspiring in general?” The district court responded that the Government had to prove Camara “was conspiring specifically with Ekobena or other known or unknown conspirators.” Camara was convicted and sentenced to 36 months in prison.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Camara’s conviction. It rejected the argument that the amendment against Camara was constructively amended by the district court’s response to the jury question, which switched his alleged coconspirators from Ekobena “and” others to Ekobena “or” others. The court concluded that the instruction did not alter the elements of the originally charged offense because it merely provided a different means of committing the same offense. The change also did not prejudice Camara’s defense, as he argued that he did everything the Government said he did, but was unaware of the stolen nature of the cars. In other words, his defense “had nothing to do with the precise identity of his co-conspirators.” The court also rejected Camara’s argument that because Ekobena was the only link to the Eastern District of Virginia venue wasn’t proper in that district, finding Camara could not meet the plain error standard.

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