Courts Can Continue to Consider “Breach of Trust” at Revocation Hearings

US v. Chafin: Chaffin was on supervised release when he was alleged to have violated his conditions in various ways, mostly related to drug use. At the revocation hearing, the Government sought a term of imprisonment, while Chaffin sought a sentence of time served. The district court imposed a sentence of 9 months in prison (plus additional supervised release), explaining that was partly to “slam some sense into him” and for “violating the trust the Court put in him.”

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Chaffin’s revocation sentence. Chaffin argued that prior precedent that allowed district courts to consider a “breach of trust” in revocation proceedings had been undermined by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Esteras. The court disagreed, noting that the Supreme Court had expressly reserved the question that the prior Fourth Circuit case had decided and, therefore, it had not been undermined. The court also noted that among the factors that courts are required to consider in revocation proceedings are the applicable Guidelines, which incorporate the “breach of trust” theory.

South Carolina First-Degree Assault Remains “Crime of Violence” for Revocation Proceeding

US v. Owens: Owens was on supervised release when he was involved in a lengthy physical altercation with a woman. At his revocation hearing, the district court concluded that Owens’ conduct constituted first-degree assault and battery under South Carolina law, which it classified as a “crime of violence” and therefore a Grade A violation. Owens did not object. The district court ultimately imposed an upward variance sentence of 24 months in prison.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Owens’ revocation sentence. Noting prior precedent in which the Fourth Circuit had held that offense was a crime of violence, the court rejected Owens’ argument that a recent South Carolina supreme court decision about related offenses undermined that precedent. The court held it did not, also noting that review was limited to plain error and imposing binding precedent, even if it was error, could not have been plain.

Court Affirms Enhancement for Assault Creating “Substantial Risk of Injury” Where No Injury Occurred

US v. Vick: Vick was in federal custody at a local jail in which he was “running” his pod, brining in contraband with the assistance of paid-off correctional officers. During an investigation of his scheme, his cell was searched and Vick attacked an officer when he “attempted to move Vick from his cell.” Vick “lifted him up off the ground, throwing him against the nearby wall, slamming him to the concrete floor,” although the officer suffered no “lasting injury that required medical treatment.” Vick pleaded guilty to bribery and conspiracy charges. At sentencing, the district court imposed a six-level enhancement because Vick’s assault created a “substantial risk of serious injury” and imposed a sentence in the middle of the resulting Guideline range.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Vick’s sentence. Vick’s primary argument was that the district court applied the wrong legal standard in imposing the enhancement, arguing that while the Guideline itself required only “assault,” the commentary required “aggravated assault” that should be defined based on the Guideline for that offense. The court disagreed, holding that the commentary narrowed the type of assault which was required, requiring that it be “tantamount” to aggravated assault. The court also rejected Vick’s argument that, even by the district court’s standard, his conduct didn’t support the enhancement (the event was on video). The court also held that the district court sufficiently explained its sentence and that the sentence was not substantively unreasonable.