Dismissal of Emotionally Fragile Juror Ex Parte Required Reversal of Convictions

US v. Laffitte: Laffitte was charged and stood trial for conspiracy and related fraud counts. During jury deliberation, several notes were received from the jury. Two were from Juror 93, who first explained that they needed medication from home and then that they were “feeling pressured to change my vote.”  The district court stated that it intended to utilize an alternate rather than delay deliberations (Laffitte suggested sending the jury home to start again the next morning). Two additional notes emerged, one from most of the jurors that another juror’s “prior court experience” was influencing their “ability to discuss the trial in a group setting.” The final note, from Juror 88, asked for an alternate because “I am experiencing anxiety and [am] unable to clearly make my decision.”

The district court, “with the consent of the parties” decided to question Juror 88 alone with a court reporter to “create a record.” The district court also said “I’m going to take action.” It then performed an in camera interview with Juror 88, in which they said they could not “perform your duties as a juror.” Therefore, the district court told Juror 88 “I’m going to honor your request and replace you then” and did so without seeking further input from the parties. Lafitte objected to the removal of Juror 88 but “not to the juror that was replaced for medication,” Juror 93. After additional instructions, the jury deliberated for less than an hour before convicting Laffitte on all counts.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed Laffitte’s convictions, ultimately concluding that the district court should have granted Laffitte’s motion for a new trial. While concluding that the district court did not err by refusing to consider an affidavits from Jurors 88 and 93 under Rule of Evidence 606(b)(1), the court did conclude that the district did err in removing Juror 88 (the court held Laffitte had waived his argument as to Juror 93), for two reasons. First, the dismissal of Juror 88 violated Laffitte’s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury because Juror 88’s note and colloquy with the district court showed that the distress they felt was due to their position on Laffitte’s guilt or innocence during deliberations. Second, the dismissal violated Laffitte’s right to be present during a critical stage of his trial, as the decision was made by the district court without input from Laffitte (or the Government, for that matter).