Rule of Completeness Doesn’t Allow for Admission of Exculpatory Portion of Phone Call

US v. Davis: Davis was the driver, and lone occupant, of a car that was subject to a traffic stop. After a short car chase, Davis tried to flee further on foot. Once apprehended, officers found 25 pills (of a couple of different varieties) in Davis’ pocket along with cash. From the car they recovered a pistol “lodged between the front passenger seat and the center console.” While in custody awaiting trial, Davis had a phone call with his girlfriend in which he first said that “none of that ain’t mine. If it was mine I would claim it,” then two minutes later said, “I ain’t want to talk about how the gun got in the car.” At trial the Government used the second statement against Davis, who was prevented from presenting the first statement to the jury as well. The district court also denied Davis’ request to instruct the jury on simple possession of drugs as an alternative to possession with intent. Davis was convicted on drug and firearm charges, then sentenced as a career offender.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Davis’ conviction and sentence. Davis’ main argument as to his drug conviction was that the district court should have allowed the jury to hear the “none of that ain’t mine” statement under the Rule of Completeness. Bypassing whether the statement was inadmissible hearsay, the court applied prior precedent that the Rule does not require (or allow) the admission of self-serving statements from the party against whom the other portion of the statement is being admitted. Davis also argued that there was insufficient evidence to support the firearm conviction, which the court rejected because “substantial evidence demonstrates that Davis was in constructed possession of the stolen and loaded” firearm found in his car. Finally, the court rejected Davis’ argument that under Campbell his prior South Carolina drug distribution convictions were not “controlled substance offenses” so as to support his career offender designation. The court, again, limited Campbell to the peculiarities of the West Virginia statute at issue in that case.