US v. Velasquez: Velasquez was charged in a five-count drug indictment. At his arraignment he pleaded guilty to three of the counts, not guilty to the other two. There was some discussion of setting a trial date at the hearing, but nothing was resolved. In a post-hearing order, the court directed counsel to work with chambers on a trial date and that "speedy trial computation excluded by the court." Three months passed before the court set a trial date, excluding the delay under the "ends of justice." Velasquez, after securing new counsel, moved to dismiss the two remaining counts under the Speedy Trial Act. The district court denied the motion, explaining that the delays were necessary "for trial preparation." Velasquez was convicted at trial and sentenced to a total of 264 months in prison.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the Speedy Trial Act motion. The court noted that while trial prep needs can be a basis for an "ends-of-justice" continuance there was no evidence here that either party needed or requested additional time. As a result, the court could not conclude that the initial arraignment order excluded time for that reason. In addition, the district court "had the opportunity to offer more clarity at the motion-to-dismiss hearing, but it gave none." As a result, the district court erred in denying the motion to dismiss. In addition, the court held that Velasquez was no estopped from raising the issue because he consented to initial representations from the Government about when it could go to trial.
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