Court Adopts Narrow Definition of Violence Against Property for Crime of Violence Determination

US v. Melaku: In 2012, Melaku pleaded guilty to three counts, including willfully injuring government property causing damage exceeding $1000 and discharging a firearm during a crime of violence – the injuring property offense. Melaku has fired shots at several government buildings in Northern Virginia “to oppose American military efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.” In 2016, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson, Melaku filed a 2255 motion arguing that the injuring property conviction was not a “crime of violence” – defined here as including the use of force “against the person or property of another” – and therefore the firearm conviction could not stand. The district court denied the motion, holding that the injuring property statute was divisible and the version of the offense Melaku pleaded guilty to constituted a crime of violence.

On appeal a divided Fourth Circuit reversed. The court first concluded that the statute at issue was, in fact, indivisible in that it “defines a single felony offense.” That it includes “willfully injury or committing depredation” against property did not mean it defined two offenses, but alternative means of commission. Those terms are “not so dissimilar as to establish distinct crimes.” Moreover the “least culpable means” of committing that offense (as required under the categorical approach) did not require the type of force necessary to be a “crime of violence.” Distinguishing robberies, “which are violent crimes involving the intimidation of a person, crimes against property do not require such personal intimidation and can be committed outside the presence of others.” Spray painting government property, for example, would fall under the statute (if it caused enough damage) but not involve violence.