Counsel’s Conflict of Interest at Plea Withdrawal Hearing Required Remand

US v. Glover: Glover was charged with numerous drug offenses and eventually pleaded guilty to two of five counts, subjecting himself to a 120-month mandatory minimum sentence. Initially, Glover tried to hire an attorney, but the attorney turned over the funds Glover sent him to the DEA, fearing they were drug proceeds. Glover tried to argue pro se that the funds were not tainted, but the district court stated it would not address the issue unless Glover agreed to represent himself going forward rather than be represented by appointed counsel. Glover did not want to represent himself and pleaded guilty while represented by counsel. However, Glover then filed a pro se motion seeking to withdraw his plea, which included “numerous allegations of misconduct” by his appointed counsel. At a hearing on the motion, Glover argued that his counsel had a conflict of interest, but the district court declined to appoint new counsel (and Glover again state he did not want to proceed pro se). As to the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, Glover’s counsel stated that the Rule 11 colloquy had been sufficient and “that a plea withdrawal hearing was not in Glover’s best interest” and that he “did not endorse or file such a motion.” Counsel stated he would “say more in a hearing under 28 USC 2255,” that the pela agreement “was very favorable to his client,” based on the facts of the case and that he was not surprised that Glover took the deal. The district court concluded that Glover’s allegations against counsel were not credible, denied the motion, and imposed the 120-month sentence.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision to deny Glover’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea without having new counsel appointed for that hearing. First, however, the court rejected Glover’s arguments regarding the seized funds, noting that his guilty plea waived “all nonjurisdictional defects” in proceedings that occurred before then. On the plea withdrawal issue, however, the court noted the Government’s position that “this claim implicates whether Glover’s counsel was constitutionally effective” and ultimately concluded that his performance was not. The crux of Glover’s motion “that his lawyer inappropriately coerced him into taking” the guilty plea by failing to prepare any suppression motion. The court also noted that counsel “argued against Glover’s motion to withdraw” which “made his conflict evident.” Given Glover’s allegations, it was difficult for counsel to meet his obligations to give his “undivided loyalties” to the client, as the “alleged conflict went well beyond differences in strategy . . . it would amount to malpractice.” While the truth of the allegations against counsel may be relevant on remand, it was not relevant on appeal as to whether such remand was required in the first place.

Judge Quattlebaum concurred, noting that “I get there by a slightly different path,” arguing that actual ineffective assistance of counsel was not the issue, but rather Glover’s right to conflict free counsel once he raised allegations suggesting a conflict.