Search Based on Probation Conditions OK, Even With Law Enforcement Impetus

US v. Scott: Scott was on probation in North Carolina. One of the statutory conditions of his release was that he submit to warrantless searches of his home by “a post-release supervision officer.” However, Scott’s own supervision agreement stated the condition as applying only to searches by “my supervising officer.” Scott’s probation officer referred him to a “multi agency operation involving federal and state law enforcement agencies” designed to locate probationers who had either absconded or had outstanding warrants “and to conduct warrantless searches of supervisees subject to search conditions.” Scott’s probation officer identified him because he wore “flashy” things, yet didn’t have a job, and he was scheduled to have a warrantless search sometime in the next 45 days. A search of Scott’s home was conducted, during which two firearms were recovered. While Scott’s probation officer wasn’t there, other probation officers were, in addition to law enforcement. Scott unsuccessfully moved to suppress the guns and was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm.

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of Scott’s motion to suppress. The court first rejected Scott’s argument that his probation officer’s absence from the search meant it was not conducted within the parameters of the condition to which he was subject. The court concluded that the statutory condition that refereed to “a post-release supervision officer” was mandatory and could not be modified by the conditions set forth in Scott’s particular agreement. Then the court concluded that the search of Scott’s apartment was “reasonably related to his post-release supervision” as required by the condition because it was “initiated and supervised” by probation officers. The involvement of other agencies did not change that analysis.