US v. Jacobs: Jacobs allegedly (that’s important!) fired a gun during a domestic dispute. Police responding to the report recovered a pistol and a rifle. Jacobs admitted to possessing the firearms and that he was felon who knew he could not possess him. He was ultimately charged both with being a felon in possession of a firearm, under §922(g)(1), and possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, under §922(g)(9). Jacobs successfully argued that both were unconstitutional under the Second Amendment as applied to Jacobs.
On an appeal by the Government, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remanded for additional proceedings. As to the §922(g)(1) count, all agreed that, by the time of appeal, both facial and as-applied challenges were not available. As to the §922(g)(9) count, while facial challenges are no longer available, the Court has yet to address whether as-applied challenges are. The Court refused to apply the §922(g)(1) precedent on as-applied challenges to §922(g)(9), leaving open the possibility of a successful challenge. However, the Court noted the numerous factual issues that needed to be resolved and that the district court’s initial decision lacked the benefit of the Fourth Circuit’s post-Bruen cases. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit remanded for further proceedings on that count.Monday, February 02, 2026
Misclassification of Defendant as Career Offender Harmless When District Court Would Impose Same Sentence Regardless
US v. Cox: Cox pleaded guilty to multiple drug charges. In the PSR, the probation officer identified two of his prior convictions as “controlled substance offenses,” making him a career offender. One of them was a 2009 drug conviction from Florida that applied not only to distribution and possession with intent to distribute but to purchasing drugs. The district court overruled Cox’s objection and imposed a sentence of 120 months – a “compromise” between the Government’s request for a bottom of the career offender Guideline sentence (151 months) and Cox’s argument for a nearly top-of-the-unenhanced Guideline sentence (104 months). The district court said it would impose the same sentence “in the event I am wrong” about the career offender determination because the un-enhanced Guideline would understate Cox’s history of recidivism.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Cox’s sentence. Although “there can be little doubt that the probation officer and the district court erred in their Guidelines calculations” (and the Government didn’t argue otherwise), the error was harmless. “The district court left no room for doubt as to what it would do upon any remand” and imposed the same 120-month sentence. Further that sentence was not substantively unreasonable.No Due Process Violation in Shifting State Prosecution Theories
Richardson v. Frame: Richardson was involved in altercation with Cool, to whom he sold a batch of low-quality cocaine. Richardson beat up Cool and, according to her, took about $100 in cash she had in her apartment. Richardson was charged in West Virginia state court with assault and robbery (among other things). The robbery was charged under the portion of the West Virginia statute that requires the threatened use of force involving a weapon, rather than the portion that involved the actual use of force.
At trial, the Government pivoted and presented a case that turned entirely on the actual use of force. Richardson’s counsel did not object. Richardson was convicted of robbery and sentenced to 100 years in prison. On direct appeal the state supreme court found no fatal variance in Richardson’s trial and, in state habeas proceedings, rejected his argument that he’d received ineffective assistance of counsel. Richardson filed a §2254 petition, which the magistrate recommended granting, only to have the district court sustain the state’s objections and deny.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of Richardson’s §2254 petition. Ultimately, the question came down to whether Richardson was prejudiced by the state’s change of theory at trial. The court held he was not, both because he was already on notice that actual violence was at issue (due to the assault charge) and because trial counsel’s defense strategy was that no money had been taken (and thus no robbery), rather than anything to do with the nature of the charged robbery. Given the required AEDPA deference, the court affirmed.
NOTE: I was counsel for Richardson in this case.
Conviction for Advocating Participation in Jihad Following 9/11 Violates First Amendment
US v. Al-Timimi: Al-Timimi helped found a mosque in Virginia and was “viewed as a respected elder and a person knowledgeable about Islam.” Prior to the 9/11 attacks, a group of men at the mosque began planning to wage jihad overseas. Al-Timimi was not part of the group and when asked if he approved “didn’t endorse or reject the idea.” Later, he did “chastise them for making their training efforts too obvious” and encouraged them to “be more discreet.” After 9/11, Al-Timimi met with others (including some of the would-be jihadists) and told them (among other things) that they must “leave the United States” and “join the mujahadeen,” that it was “obligatory on all Muslims to go and defend Afghanistan,” and that “it doesn’t matter if we fight the Indians or the Russians or the Americans, that this is all legitimate jihad.” He also encouraged men to “go to Pakistan” and join and train with a particular terrorist group.
In 2004, Al-Timimi was charged with ten counts related to inducing or soliciting others to (among other things) use firearms, levy war against the United States, and aid the Taliban. All the counts were based on speech Al-Timimi had made. He was convicted on all counts and sentenced to a total of 360 months in prison. Twice Al-Timimi appealed, only to have the case remanded for additional proceedings, one of which resulted in several counts being vacated on Johnson/Davis grounds. In 2020, Al-Timimi was released to home confinement due to the Covid-19 pandemic.
On the third go around, the Fourth Circuit vacated Al-Timimi’s remaining convictions, concluding that they violated the First Amendment. The primary argument was whether his speech constituted incitement to imminent lawless action or rose to the level of facilitation or solicitation of unlawful conduct. The Court concluded it was not, applying the Brandenberg standard, which requires that the “advocated-for lawless action must be happening quite soon.” What Al-Timimi urged was “neither sufficiently imminent nor sufficiently definite to lose First Amendment protection,” with the court noting that he “specified no time from in which these actions should be completed and no details as to how they should be carried out.” His “exhortations were vague and general.” Al-Timimi’s speech “was not participation but merely encouragement,” which was not sufficient to support aiding and abetting convictions. Nor did he encourage, “with the requite intent, a specific unlawful act.”
Divided Court Concludes False Documents Submitted During Immigration Process Were “Required” and Covered by Statute
US v. Aborisade: Aborisade, who was not a lawyer, ran a “legal center” where he primarily helped clients file “various immigration petitions,” including those under the Violence Against Women Act’s “self-petitions” system for abused spouses. For those petitions, Aborisade used prior psychological evaluations and modified them for use by other applicants, as well as fabricating lease documents. His clients ultimately submitted the false documents as part of their petitions. Aborisade was ultimately convicted at trial of numerous counts, primarily of vias fraud and aggravated identity theft and sentenced to 57 months in prison.
On appeal, a divided Fourth Circuit affirmed Aborisade’s convictions. The primary issue was whether the false documents at issue were “required” to be part of the applications at issue, as the statute required. The Court concluded that they were, holding that while those types of documents were not specifically required, some evidence was required to prove eligibility under VAWA and since those documents were that evidence it was “required.” The court also rejected Aborisade’s argument that he could not be convicted under the statute because he did not personally present the petitions (with the false documents) to immigration authorities.
Judge Heytens dissented, arguing that the statute does not require the submission of “any one document or type of document” and that the necessary proof could come from other sources, such as witnesses. Therefore, the documents at issue were not “required” under the statute.
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