State Sentencing Sheet Sufficiently Clear to Show Prior Conviction Was Controlled Substance Offense

US v. Boyd: Boyd was convicted of drug and firearm offenses. The probation officer concluded that Boyd was a career offender based on prior convictions in South Carolina for assault with intent to kill and possession with intent to distribute marijuana. He objected, arguing that the assault conviction could be committed recklessly and that the relevant Shepard documents for the drug conviction were “inconclusive about the crime of conviction.” The district court rejected both arguments and imposed a sentence of 262 months in prison.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Boyd’s sentence. In his initial briefing, Boyd did not raise any issue related to the assault conviction, but sought to raise the mens rea argument after the Supreme Court’s decision in Borden via a supplemental authority letter. The court ordered additional briefing on the matter, including whether Boyd had abandoned that argument. Ultimately, the court held that he had, noting that Borden did not change the law in the Fourth Circuit and, therefore, the mens rea argument was available when the case was initially briefed. As to the drug offense, the court concluded that it had previously held that “sentencing sheets” from South Carolina were sufficient to prove the nature of a prior offense and that the specific sheet here, which included the notations “poss.” and “w.i.t.d.” was sufficient to prove he was convicted of a controlled substance offense.

Judge Harris dissented on the drug offense issue (which would have rendered the assault argument moot), arguing that the sentencing sheet was sufficiently ambiguous that it could not clearly demonstrate which offense Boyd had pleaded guilty to.

No Relief Available for Ex-Inmate Whose Prior Possession Felony Now Misdemeanor

US v. Payne: In 2000, Payne was convicted of several simple possession offenses, including one involving crack cocaine. As a result, he was convicted of a felony on that count and sentenced to 63 months in prison (with 12-month sentences on the other possession counts being served concurrently). He completed his term of imprisonment in 2004 and his supervised release in 2007. In 2015, after the passage of the Fair Sentencing Act, Payne unsuccessfully filed a writ of error coram nobis seeking to have his crack conviction reclassified as a misdemeanor. In 2019, after the passage of the First Step Act, he filed a similar motion, arguing that his conviction was a covered offense and the district court could impose a reduced sentence by reclassifying his offense as a misdemeanor. The district court denied the motion.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of Payne’s motion, concluding that there was no basis for relief under either the First Step Act or Declaratory Judgment Act. As to the First Step Act, the court held that there was no longer any sentence to reduce and that the Act simply did not grant courts the authority to reclassify prior offenses. That is because the First Step Act “makes clear that it operates on extant sentences, not the classification of completed offenses as misdemeanors,” noting that the Act “operates on penalties, not convictions.” As to the Declaratory Judgment Act, the court concluded it did not grant courts authority to reclassify prior convictions “unless another substantive portion of law retroactively changed the classification of the defendant’s offense.” The Fair Sentencing Act was not retroactive and did not “extinguish Payne’s liability for a felony offense.”

Cannot Use Compassionate Release Proceeding to Collaterally Attack Conviction

US v. Ferguson: In 2004, Ferguson was convicted on multiple drug offenses and sentenced to 765 months in prison. His convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal and in two 2255 proceedings, although he did receive a reduction of his sentence to 622 months due to retroactive Guideline amendments. In 2020, Ferguson submitted a request to the warden of his institution for compassionate release due to the COVID pandemic and his increased risk of death from the disease. The warden denied the request, so Fergusson filed a compassionate release motion in district court. In addition to the COVID argument, Ferguson also raised several additional arguments challenging his sentence and convictions, including ineffective of counsel claims. The district court denied the motion.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of Ferguson’s motion for compassionate release. Before reaching the merits of Ferguson’s motion, the court dealt with two procedural issues. First, the court joined several other courts of appeals in concluding that it had jurisdiction under 28 USC 1291 to review the denial of Ferguson’s motion. Second, the court concluded that the compassionate release statute had no requirement that a defendant exhaust his remedies within the Bureau of Prisons with regard to every issue raised in a compassionate release motion. It is enough to request compassionate release on some ground. As to the merits, however, court concluded that compassionate release proceedings could not be used to collaterally attack a defendant’s conviction or sentence. That is because 2255 is the “exclusive remedy” for such matters. It distinguished cases like McCoy that were partially based on changed, non-retroactive law that led to reduced sentences on the basis that those defendants were not seeking the invalidation of their convictions.