Documents, While Wrongly Withheld, Were Not Material to Conspiracy Conviction

US v. Blankenship: Blankenship was CEO of a coal mining company when an explosion in one of its mines killed 29 people. That led to an investigation of the mine, showing that it had a history of failed compliance with safety regulations and that Blankenship frequently pushed to up coal production rather than comply with those regulations. He was eventually charged with conspiring to violate those regulations and was convicted by a jury of that misdemeanor offense and was sentenced to a year in prison. After his conviction, the Government turned over additional documents which Blankenship claimed, in a 2255 motion, had been improperly withheld under Brady and Giglio. The district court agreed that the documents had been withheld improperly, but affirmed Blankenship’s conviction, concluding that they were not material to his conviction. 

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of Blankenship’s 2255 motion. As to one group of documents, interview notes for interviews of several other high-ranking employees in the company, the court concluded that Blankenship was not denied access to that evidence, as he had most of those employees on his own witness list. Thus, the “case falls squarely under the principle that the Brady doctrine is not available where the favorable information is available to the defendant and lies in a source where a reasonable defendant would have looked. As to the other group, internal regulatory agency documents that Blankenship alleged suggested bias in its investigations of him and the mine, the court concluded that judge because they were “unflattering” to the agency did not make them material to Blankenship’s prosecution, as none of the agency employees involved testified at trial or appeared to have any influence on the decision to prosecute Blankenship.

Court Affirms Drug and Firearm Convictions, Laments Current Conspiracy Law (Again)

US v. Dennis: Officers where doing drug surveillance at a shopping plaza when they observed Dennis and his codefendant Guess drive up, speak briefly to the object of the surveillance, then drive away. After Guess (who was driving) ran a stop sign, officers attempted to make a traffic stop, leading do a “high-speed chase” through (among other places) a “Waffle House parking lot.” Along the way, an officer saw the passenger (Dennis) toss a gun and a bag from the car. They were recovered, with the bag containing 33 grams of heroin. Dennis and Guess were caught and charged with conspiring to distribute cocaine (found on Guess’ person) and heroin, possession of heroin with intent to distribute it, and firearm offenses. Dennis was convicted on all counts at trial (Guess was convicted on the two drug counts) and sentenced to 96 months in prison. 

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Dennis’ convictions. First, the court concluded that there was no error in the district court’s handling of Dennis’ Batson challenge during voir dire when the Government struck the only remaining juror of color. The court concluded that Dennis did not make a prima facie showing under Batson (the other two potential jurors of color had been struck by Guess), but even if he did the court found the Government’s explanation for the strike was not pretextual. The Government had argued it was concerned that the juror was a social worker and might be sympathetic to criminal defendants. It distinguished that juror from a white juror who was also a social worker (but was not struck) by noting that the white juror had been the victim of a crime that involved a highspeed chase, which outweighed concerns about work-related sympathies. Second, the court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to sustain all of Dennis’ convictions, at least given the applicable standard of review. As in Moody, the court noted its discomfort with the way current conspiracy law allows for convictions that overlap with underlying substantive offenses. Finally, the court held there was no error in the jury being instructed that the Government was not required to utilize any particular investigative techniques, noting that it had “held such instructions proper since 1992.”

Government Failed to Prove Bodily Injury for Guideline Enhancement

US v. Lewis: Lewis (along with two others) robbed a pawn shop, during which “Lewis pointed his firearm at the manager and struck him I the back of the head three times, causing him to fall on the floor.” He was left with a “red spot” on the back of his head, felt “dizzy,” and was taken to the hospital for more than $3500 in unspecific tests and treatment. After Lewis pleaded guilty to robbery and firearm offenses, the probation officer recommended that his Guideline range be enhanced because he inflicted a serious bodily injury. The district court concluded that the enhancement applied, having “guess[ed]” that the manager had suffered a “mild concussion.” All that was necessary was that the manager had “an injury that caused him to seek medical attention, and he did.” Lewis was sentenced to a total of 130 months in prison. 

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit vacated Lewis’ sentence, concluding that the district court had improperly applied the law as related to the bodily injury enhancement. Under the Guidelines “bodily injury” is defined as “any significant injury,” but does not further define the term. The court noted that while the injury does not need to “interfere completely with the injured person’s life” it “cannot be wholly trivial” and must “last for some meaningful period.” Medical treatment consisting entirely of “precautionary measures” do not suggest an injury is significant. Thus, a injury that lasts for some time and is more than wholly trivial are “necessary, though perhaps not sufficient, conditions for the enhancement.” Here, the district court erred by not applying that standard. The court held that such error was not harmless, rejecting the Government’s argument that the facts develop supported the enhancement under the proper standard, noting that the Government failed to produce medical records to show what treatment the victim received.

Congrats to the Defender office in Western North Carolina on the win!

No Error In Attributing “Ice” Methamphetamine to Coconspirators

US v. Williams: Williams and his three codefendants were involved in a methamphetamine trafficking conspiracy (which included at least 24 others) and pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and conspiracy. At sentencing, the main issue was whether they could be properly attributed “actual” methamphetamine (also known as “ice”) as relevant conduct, rather than a more favorably treated methamphetamine mixture, and whether the district court should rejected the advisory Guideline range related to ice. The district court attributed ice to Williams and the other and rejected their policy-based arguments for a variance, sentencing them to terms of imprisonment ranging from 151 to 360 months. 

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the sentences of Williams and the others. The court first briefly addressed the policy-based ice/mixture disparity, noting that while the district court had the discretion to disregard the Guidelines due to that disparity, it was not required to and there was no abuse of discretion in rejecting that argument. Turning to relevant conduct, the court noted differing approaches of other Circuits when determining whether to attribute coconspirators ice or mixture for relevant conduct, ultimately agreeing with the Seventh Circuit that the 80%-threshold for separating mixture from ice “must have meaning” and thus the Government must prove that the methamphetamine involved met that standard, although laboratory tests of purity are not necessarily required. An individualized assessment of whether “it was reasonably foreseeable to each individual defendant that the conspiracy involved methamphetamine of at least 80% purity” was needed. The court then walked through the evidence for each defendant, as well as the general observation that nearly all of the samples tested from the conspiracy were ice, and concluded that the district court did not clearly err in attributing ice to Williams and his codefendants.