Money Laundering Conspiracy Statute Reaches Defendant Overseas

US v. Ojedokun: Ojedokun lived in Nigeria while he was involved in a “romance scam,” in which people online posed as potential romantic partners of victims while siphoning away their money. Ojedokun’s part of the scheme was to take funds and transfers from the front-line scammers, some of whom were in the United States, and launder them before redistributing them. During the run of the scheme he never set foot in the United States. However, after the conspiracy ended he came to Illinois for college and was eventually charged with conspiracy to commit money laundering. He was convicted after a jury trial and sentenced to 108 months in prison.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Ojedokun’s conviction and sentence. First, the court rejected Ojedokun’s argument that the money laundering conspiracy statute could not reach his actions that occurred entirely in Nigeria. At issue here was the extraterritoriality provision of 18 USC 1956 which applies its provisions to “conduct” that partly occurs in the United States. Ojedokun argued that because money laundering conspiracy does not require an overt act, only an agreement, that it did not involve “conduct” within the meaning of the statute. The court disagreed, reading “conduct” broadly to include agreements of conspirators, not just specific acts taken in furtherance of the conspiracy. The court also concluded that some conduct occurred in the United States, given that some of the other coconspirators were located there. Second, the court rejected Ojedokun’s indictment was untimely. The original indictment charged a money laundering conspiracy, the object of which was conspiracy to commit wire fraud – which is not one of the listed objects in the statute. The Government got a superseding indictment changing it to actual wire fraud (which is listed), but that was done after the five-year statute of limitations ran. The court concluded that the superseding indictment related back to the original one, as the facts underlying it were the same and Ojedokun had notice of the alleged conduct. The superseding indictment did not change or expand the charge itself. The court also rejected Ojedokun’s plan error argument that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated and declined to consider whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue the Fourth Amendment claims.

Inmate Not Required to Pursue All Administrative Remedies Before Requesting Compassionate Release

US v. Muhammad: Muhammad was convicted of distributing crack and powder cocaine and sentenced to 210 months in prison. He requested compassionate release from the warden at FCI Loretto, which was rejected less than three weeks later. Rather that pursue any appeal within the Bureau of Prisons of that denial, Muhammad filed a motion for compassionate release in district court. The Government resisted the request on the merits, but did not deny that Muhammad had met the requirements for seeking relief in court. Nonetheless, the district court denied Muhammad’s request because had not exhausted all his potential administrative remedies before seeking relief from the district court.

The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remanded to the district court to consider Muhammad’s request on the merits. Under the First Step Act, an inmate must first seek compassionate release from the Bureau of Prisons, but can go to court once that request is rejected or 30 days has passed. The court first held that the rule was not jurisdictional, but a claim processing rule, which the Government’s failure to argue in the district court could not waive. The court then held that although there were additional avenues of appeal for Muhammad in the Bureau of Prisons, once 30 days had elapsed from his request he was able to seek relief in court.

Court Affirms Civil Commitment Against Timeliness Challenge

US v. Curbow: In 2018, Curbow was charged in the Northern District of Mississippi with attempting to damage aircraft after firing a shotgun at military helicopters. During the course of that prosecution, the district court concluded that Curbow was incompetent and ordered him committed to the custody of the Attorney General to determine if his competency could be restored. As a result, he was sent to FMC Butner in North Carolina. Curbow’s competency was never restored and he was eventually civilly committed as a dangerous person.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Curbow’s commitment. Curbow did not challenge the North Carolina court’s determination of dangerousness, but argued that the court lacked the authority to order such commitment because he was no longer in the custody of the Attorney General, as required by the civil commitment statute. That was due to the time periods that ran between the various orders of the court in Mississippi and proceedings in North Carolina. The Fourth Circuit rejected those challenges, ultimately concluding that the proper calculation of the time periods showed that Curbow was in custody at the critical time.

This is a lengthy opinion that spawned two concurrences and is a must read for anyone who deals with civil commitment or has a client who may get caught up in that procedure.

Virginia Robbery Can Be Committed By Threatening Accusation of Sodomy

White v. US: In March the Fourth Circuit issued a decision called US v. White, in which the defendant argued that because robbery in Virginia can be committed by threatening to accuse the victim of having committed sodomy it was not a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act. The Fourth Circuit agreed that, if that was the case, it was not a violent felony, but certified the question of the scope of Virginia state law to the Virginia Supreme Court. Now the state supreme court has weighed in and agreed that robbery in Virginia can be committed in that manner.

Robbery in Virginia is not defined by statute, but by the common law. Therefore, the court engaged in a lengthy review of English common law treatises and cases about the scope of robbery. While the offense can be committed with actual violence, it can also be committed via threats and not just of force, but, indeed, of threatening to accuse someone else of having committed sodomy. The court held that “sodomy” in this situation means criminal sexual conduct (crimes “against nature”) as defined by then-current law, but noted that Virginia has several of those offense on the books. While this review might seem like enough to settle the question, the court doesn’t rely on it. Instead, it recognized that it had defined the scope of robbery this broadly in several prior (albeit old) cases and, given the solid foundation on which they were based, could not say they were wrongly decided. It’s up to the Virginia legislature to make changes to the common law. But based on the court’s ruling, White’s sentence should be vacated and he should be resentenced without the ACCA enhancement.